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Abstract 
The Graph Model for Conflict Resolution (GMCR) is expanded by designing a novel 
approach for the evaluation of the effectiveness of actions or options controlled by the 
decision makers (DMs) in a dispute with respect to the potential resolutions or equilibria. 
This new procedure, called Option Effectiveness, determines the relative importance of each 
option based on its selection within each resolution contained in the set of equilibria, as well 
as the types of solution concepts, or behavior under conflict, that form the equilibria. The 
solution concepts, or stability definitions, used in this method consist of Nash, Sequential 
Stability (SEQ), Symmetric Metarationality (SMR), and General Metarationality (GMR). 
More specifically, the strength of an equilibrium type from strongest to weakest is Nash, 
SEQ, SMR, and GMR. Based on this, the effectiveness or impact of a given option is 
calculated according to its presence in an equilibrium. This permits the options to be ranked 
according to their importance or effectiveness in resolving the dispute under consideration. 
By better understanding which options are crucial, a given DM can focus his effort on 
choosing strategies which will have a bigger impact on what occurs as the conflict evolves 
over time to a final resolution. 
The Option Effectiveness approach was tested and refined by applying it to four different 
real-world conflicts. In particular, the ongoing trade dispute between the United States (US) 
and China over a number of different trade agreements and financial institutions is modeled 
and analyzed at three points in time using the GMCR methodology in combination with the 
  iv 
Option Effectiveness advancement given in this thesis. In fact, it was this particular conflict 
which motivated the author to develop the Option Effectiveness approach. This trade dispute 
is divided into three phases in time. The first phase starts when China leads the initiative to 
establish the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB) and the US considers levying 
countermeasures. The second phase is when the US attempts to launch the Trans Pacific 
Partnership (TPP) agreement and offers China terms regarding the AIIB. In the case of China 
accepting the US conditions, the US will withdraw its opposition to the AIIB and announce 
a truce over it. The third phase is subsequent to the inauguration of Mr. Donald Trump as the 
President of the US in early 2017 and his withdrawal of the US from the TPP while China 
considers the launching of the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP) trade 
agreement. The Option Effectiveness approach is further illustrated by applying it to three 
other conflicts: the Cuban Missile Crisis of 1962 and two environmental conflicts called the 
Elmira Groundwater Contamination conflict and the Garrison Diversion Unit irrigation 
dispute. The insights revealed by applying the Option Effectiveness approach to these 
conflicts, confirm the advantages of utilizing the Option Effectiveness method in conflict 
analysis.  
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Chapter 1 
Introduction 
Every day, countries and individuals participate in negotiations and conflicts.  These 
conflicts, for instance, can be of an economic, military, or corporate nature.  Analyzing such 
conflicts educates decision-makers (DMs) about a dispute, permitting them to think 
strategically and thereby helping in making more calculated decisions.  The Graph Model for 
Conflict Resolution (GMCR) approach has been shown to be a reliable and valuable method 
to analyze disputes and conflicts involving two or more DM (Fang, Hipel, & Kilgour, 1993; 
Fang, Hipel, Kilgour, & Peng, 2003a, 2003b; Kilgour & Hipel, 2005, 2010; Kinsara, 
Petersons, Hipel, & Kilgour, 2015b; Xu, Hipel, Kilgour, & Fang, 2018).   
For example, the strategic investigation of the military and political conflict between the 
United States (US) and the Soviet Union (USSR), formally known as the Cuban Missile 
Crisis (Fraser & Hipel, 1982, 1984; Hipel, 2011), using GMCR methodology has shown the 
GMCR approach’s capabilities in predicting the possible outcomes of a conflict.  Another 
illustration can be the water conflict over the Euphrates River between Syria, Iraq, and 
Turkey, which demonstrates the GMCR methodology and adds the concept of the inverse 
GMCR approach (Kinsara, Kilgour, & Hipel, 2015a).  However, up till now, the GMCR 
approach has been focused on analyzing conflicts at the level of states or scenarios.  The 
option effectiveness approach, a novel method presented in this thesis, allows a detailed 
investigation of the conflict model at the option level, in turn allowing a DM to better 
 2 
understand the options or the actions needed to define states, and comprehend the 
consequences of selecting an option which a DM controls, thereby possibly resolving the 
conflict in its favor.  
1.1.1 Motivation 
Analysis of the economic conflict between China and the US over global trade agreements 
has shown that the conflict can be influenced to end in a more desirable resolution by adding 
appropriate options (Alhindi, Hipel, & Kilgour, 2018b).  Therefore, understanding the way 
each option works in a conflict can add valuable insights for a DM, which would ultimately 
aid him or her in choosing the best option to end the conflict at a preferred scenario.  
1.1.2 Research Objective 
The purpose of this thesis is to introduce a new method which allows DMs and analysts to 
investigate a conflict model at the option level, rather than just investigating it at the state 
level of the conflict.  This novel approach is named “Option Effectiveness”, which computes 
the effectiveness of each option in a conflict.  It can also be useful, for instance, in classifying 
the equilibria or resolutions of a conflict according to the utilization of the primary options 
as suggested by Fang et al. (2003a, 2003b).  
1.1.3 Thesis Structure 
The thesis is divided into seven chapters.  Chapter 1 discusses the GMCR approach generally 
and states the motivation of the study, while the basics and fundamentals of the GMCR 
methodology are reviewed in Chapter 2.  Chapter 3 introduces the Option Effectiveness 
 3 
approach as an extension to GMCR methodology, while Chapter 4 highlights the economic 
politics of the US and China and the global economic aftermath of World War II.  The conflict 
between China and the US over global trade agreements, demonstrating the GMCR 
methodology and the Option Effectiveness approach, are explained in Chapter 5.  Evaluation 
of the Option Effectiveness procedure is carried out in Chapter 6 by applying it to important 
real-world conflict models. The conclusions of the research and future work possibilities are 
discussed in Chapter 7.  Figure 1.1 portrays the connections among the chapters and the 
contents of the thesis. 
Finally, this thesis contains some of the author’s work, both published and submitted for 
publication, which includes “The Conflict Over the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank 
Involving China, USA, and Japan” (Alhindi, Hipel, & Kilgour, 2017b) © 2017 IEEE; “A 
Measure for Option Effectiveness in the Graph Model for Conflict Resolution” (Alhindi, 
Hipel, & Kilgour, 2018a); “The Conflict over Global Trade Agreements Between China and 
the United States” (Alhindi et al., 2018b); and “Option Effectiveness in Conflict Resolution” 
(Alhindi, Kilgour, &, Hipel, 2018c) © 2018 IEEE. 
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Figure 1.1 Thesis Outline 
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Chapter 2 
Literature Review 
Conflicts are inevitable when interests of the Decision Makers (DMs) differ. A conflict has 
been defined as a situation involving two or more parties in a dispute over an issue or resource 
(Fraser & Hipel, 1984). Because no extensive modeling approach mimicking real conflict, 
allowing for better understanding between involved parties, and helping decision makers 
(DMs) make better judgements exists, a Conflict Analysis methodology was proposed by 
Fraser and Hipel (1979, 1984). A subsequent advancement in the field of conflict analysis 
named Graph Model for Conflict Resolution (GMCR) was later proposed by Kilgour, Hipel, 
and Fang (1987). Conflict investigation is crucial for analysts and DMs because of the 
increased social and political implications of decisions (Fraser & Hipel, 1984). One needs to 
fully understand the hypothetical consequences of a decision before executing it. 
GMCR analyzes and predicts conflict outcomes, and can handle all conflicts, including 
economic, military, or corporate (Fang et al., 1993; Kilgour & Hipel, 2005; Kilgour & Hipel, 
2010; Alhindi, Hipel, & Kilgour, 2017a, 2017b; Xu et al., 2018).  Typically, a conflict model, 
using GMCR, specifies the DMs relevant to the conflict, the options each DM controls, and 
the preference ranking for each DM (i.e., a ranking of scenarios according to DM’s 
preference for how the conflict should end) ( Fang et al., 1993; Kilgour & Hipel, 2005).  The 
following sections explain these GMCR fundamentals.  
 6 
2.1 Graph Model for Conflict Resolution 
The GMCR methodology requires a sound understanding of the conflict.  The conflict needs 
to be examined as a whole rather than a series of discrete events. It consists of two main 
stages: modeling and analysis (Kilgour et al., 1987; Fang et al., 1993; Kilgour & Hipel, 2005).  
Fig 2.1 based on Hipel & Walker (2011) shows the GMCR procedure which includes the 
following steps: 
1) Identification of both the point in time at which the conflict is analyzed and the DMs 
in the conflict. 
2) Identification of the feasible scenarios, or states that may occur, in the conflict 
because of option combinations available to the DMs. Options are also identified as 
reversible or irreversible.  
3) Elimination of any infeasible option combinations from the model, based on 
conditions such as mutually exclusive options, specifying that at least one option must 
be chosen within a set of options, dependency among options, or any other kind of 
infeasibility that could arise (Fang et al., 2003a, 2003b). Then the allowable 
transitions between feasible states are identified.  
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Figure 2.1 GMCR Procedure 
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4) Establishment of each DM’s relative preference over the feasible states. As a 
consequence, unilateral improvements (UIs) and unilateral moves (UMs) can be 
determined. UIs constitute allowable moves to preferred states, as compared to the 
initial state; UMs constitute allowable moves from the initial state to another state, 
regardless of preference. 
After the fourth step of the modeling stage, the conflict model is ready for the analysis 
stage.  The analysis stage can be summarized as follows: 
1) Individual stability analysis: This step is achieved by applying a variety of solution 
concepts, including Nash stability (Nash, 1950; Nash, 1951), sequential (SEQ) 
stability (Fraser & Hipel, 1979, 1984), general metarational (GMR) stability 
(Howard, 1971), and symmetric metarational (SMR) stability (Howard, 1971). It 
identifies the stability of each state in the model for each DM. 
2) Equilibrium identification: The information gathered from the individual stability 
analysis determines the equilibrium states. An equilibrium state is a state that is stable 
for all DMs in the model under a given solution concept. For instance, if there are two 
DMs, A and B, and if State S1 is stable for both A and B under SEQ stability then 
State S1 is an equilibrium under the SEQ stability definition. 
3) Sensitivity analysis: sensitivity analysis can be performed on a GMCR model by 
changing, for example, the preference ranking of the states for a given DM, or by 
adding or removing options.  
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4) Conclusions: The stability analysis and the sensitivity analysis help to form a strategic 
understanding of the conflict, including how it may evolve and where it will resolve. 
This understanding allows the DM to calculate the relative benefit of moving from 
the current state.   
Analyzing a conflict allows DMs to make better informed actions based on conclusions 
drawn from the conflict analysis.  The advantages of such analysis are listed below: 
1) It permits a realistic and objective approach that analyzes complex situations based 
on information retained and structured in the premodeling and modeling stages 
2) It provides an easy and effective medium for communicating a conclusion about the 
dispute. 
3) It determines the gaps where further information is required. 
4) It draws implications and conclusions from the information that was acquired during 
the conflict investigation. 
5) It provides clarity to the analyst or the DMs, regarding situational clarity and the 
determination of a desirable course of action. 
(Fraser & Hipel, 1984, p. 8) 
Although the GMCR approach is simple, it is time-consuming in manual investigations of 
large disputes.  Software such as GMCR II (Hipel, Kilgour, Fang, & Peng, 1997; Fang et al., 
2003a, 2003b) and GMCR+ (Kinsara et al., 2015b) applies the GMCR methodology on real-
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world conflicts and permits an easy-to-use automated approach for the understanding and 
analysis of complex conflicts.  
2.1.1 Fundamentals and Definitions of the Graph Model for Conflict Resolution 
The GMCR methodology was first introduced by Kilgour, Hipel, and Fang (1987).  The 
methodology revolves around certain fundamental ideas and definitions that are explained 
below. They are derived from Kilgour et al. (1987) and Kilgour & Hipel (2010). 
• Decision-makers: the set of DMs is represented by N, satisfying 2 ≤ n = |N| < ∞. The 
set N is usually written N = {1, 2, … , 𝑖, … , 𝑛}. 
• Options: the set of options available in the conflict for each DM 𝑖 in N is represented 
as 𝑂𝑖 =  {𝑜?̅?
𝑖 ∶  ?̅? = 1, 2, … , 𝑀𝑖}, where  𝑜?̅?
𝑖  is the ?̅?𝑡ℎ option for DM 𝑖 and 𝑀𝑖 is the total 
number of options available for DM 𝑖.  
Moreover, the set of options for all DMs in N is denoted by 𝑂 = ∪𝑖 ∈ 𝑁 𝑂𝑖. 
• Strategy: The set of strategies for each DM 𝑖 is expressed by mapping function 𝑔𝑖 ∶
 𝑂𝑖 →  {0, 1}, where for each option ?̅? = 1, 2, … , 𝑀𝑖, 
𝑔𝑖(𝑜?̅?
𝑖 ) =  {
1,  𝑖𝑓 𝐷𝑀 𝑖 𝑠𝑒𝑙𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑠 𝑜?̅?
𝑖
0, 𝑜𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑤𝑖𝑠𝑒
 
• States: The set of states is expressed by 𝑺 =  {𝑠1, 𝑠2, … , 𝑠2𝜆}, where 2 ≤ 𝑀 = |S| < 
∞, 𝑀is the total number of options available in the model and  2𝜆 is the total number of 
states in the model (and will be explained later). Moreover, the status quo state is 
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represented by 𝑺𝟎. Note that a state can be represented by a mapping function 𝑓 ∶ 𝑂 →
 {0, 1} such that,  
𝑓(𝑜?̅?
𝑖 ) =  {
1,  𝑖𝑓 𝐷𝑀 𝑖 𝑠𝑒𝑙𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑠 𝑜?̅?
𝑖 , 𝑓𝑜𝑟 𝑖 = 1, 2, … , 𝑛
0, 𝑜𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑤𝑖𝑠𝑒
 
Therefore, a state is expressed by a 𝜆-dimensional column vector, where 𝜆 is the total 
number of options in 𝑂.  Moreover, a state is defined by the 𝜆-dimensional column vector 
in the form of (𝑓(𝑜1
1), 𝑓(𝑜2
1), … , 𝑓(𝑜𝑀1
1 ), … , 𝑓(𝑜1
𝑛), 𝑓(𝑜2
𝑛), … , 𝑓(𝑜𝑀𝑛
𝑛 ))𝑇.  The total number 
of mathematically possible states in a model is 2𝜆, where 𝜆 = |𝑂|, since each option in 𝑂 
can either be selected or not by the DM 𝑖 controlling it.  Usually, one can eliminate some 
states based on conditions such as mutual exclusivity of options, requiring that at least 
one option must be selected in the scenarios, option dependency on other options, and 
any other type of infeasibility that could occur (Fang et al., 2003a, 2003b).  The 
eliminated states constitute infeasible states, whereas the states that survived the 
elimination process are feasible states.  The DMs’ strategies associated with 𝑠1  are 
represented as 𝑔1
𝑠1 , 𝑔2
𝑠1 , … , 𝑔𝑖
𝑠1 , … , 𝑔𝑛
𝑠1 ; for N = {1, 2, … , 𝑖, … , 𝑛} . Thus, states 𝑠1 is 
represented by  𝑠1 = ((𝑔1
𝑠1)
𝑇
, (𝑔2
𝑠1)
𝑇
, … , ( 𝑔𝑖
𝑠1)
𝑇
, … , (𝑔𝑛
𝑠1)
𝑇
)
𝑇
. 
• Relative Preferences: For each DM 𝑖 in N, ⪰𝒊 is a complete set of binary relations on 
S that express DM 𝑖’s preferences over S. Therefore, if s, t ∈ S then s ⪰𝒊 t indicates that 
s is more preferred than t for DM 𝑖 or that DM 𝑖 equally prefers s to t. Following a 
standard convention, DM 𝑖 firmly prefers s to t, which is mathematically expressed as s 
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≻𝑖 t, iff s ⪰𝑖 t but ¬ [t ⪰𝑖 s]. Moreover, the statement that DM 𝑖 is indifferent between s 
and t, or that DM 𝑖 equally prefers s to t, is represented s ∼𝑖 t; it is valid if both s ⪰𝑖 t and 
t ⪰𝑖 s. 
• Transitions: For each DM 𝑖  in N, a directed graph is represented by 𝐺𝑖 = (𝑆, 𝐴𝑖) 
where the arc set 𝐴𝑖 ⊆ S × S. The arc set 𝐴𝑖 does not contain loops because any entry (s, 
t) ∊ 𝐴𝑖 has the property s ≠ t. Moreover, the entries or values of 𝐴𝑖(𝑘), such that 𝑘 ∊ 𝑺, 
are state transitions or UMs controlled by DM 𝑖 from 𝑘. The set of UIs for DM 𝑖 from 𝑘 
is denoted by 𝐴𝑖
+(𝑘) where 𝑘 ∊ 𝑺. 
• Graph model: the graph model of a conflict is represented by Equation 2.1. 
 𝐆 =  〈𝐍, 𝐒, {𝐴𝑖: 𝑖 ∈ 𝐍}, {⪰𝑖 : 𝑖 ∈ 𝐍}〉 (2.1) 
2.1.2 Solution Concepts within GMCR 
Solution concepts are a key part of the GMCR methodology, specifically for the analysis 
stage. This section elaborates the attributes and properties of the solution concepts. Table 2.1 
is derived from a table mentioned in “Interactive Decision Making: The Graph Model for 
Conflict Resolution” published by Fang et al. (1993) and summarizes the key attributes of the 
solution concepts.  
2.1.2.1 Nash Stability 
Nash stability revolves around the idea that a DM will always choose the alternative that 
yields the most preferred possible scenario.  Nash stability is formally defined in Definition 
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2.1 (Nash, 1950; Nash, 1951; Fang, Hipel, & Kilgour, 1989; Fang et al., 1993; Xu et al., 
2018).  State 𝑘 is Nash stable, in a n-DM model where 𝑛 > 2, for DM 𝑖 iff 𝑖 does not have 
any UIs to move to a more preferred state from 𝑘.  The Nash solution concept considers only 
one move in the future, requires self-knowledge of preferences, and ignores all strategic risks. 
Definition 2.1 Let 𝑖 ∊ 𝐍. A state is Nash stable for DM 𝑖 , denoted by 𝑘 ∊ 𝑺𝑖
𝑁𝑎𝑠ℎ , iff 
 𝐴𝑖
+(𝑘) = ∅. 
Table 2.1 Basic solution concept descriptions and attributes (Fang et al., 1993) 
Solution Concepts Description 
Foresight 
(Future 
Steps) 
Knowledge 
of 
Preferences 
Dis-
improvement 
Strategic 
Risk 
Nash Stability 
Principal DM can’t 
move unilaterally to a 
more preferred state 
1 Own Never Ignores risk 
Sequential 
Stability (SEQ) 
Opponents’ unilateral 
improvements sanction 
all concerned DM’s 
unilateral improvements 
2 All Never 
Takes some 
risks; 
satisfice 
Symmetric 
Metarationality 
(SMR) 
Opponents’ unilateral 
moves sanction all 
principal DM’s 
unilateral improvements, 
even after response by 
the principal DM 
3 Own 
By opponents’ 
sanctions 
Avoids risks 
General 
Metarationality 
(GMR) 
Opponents’ unilateral 
moves sanction all 
concerned DM’s 
unilateral improvements 
2 Own 
By opponents’ 
sanctions 
Avoids risk 
 
2.1.2.2 Sequential Stability 
The SEQ stability concept is formally expressed by Definition 2.2 (Fang et al., 1993; Xu et 
al., 2018).  In an n-DM model where 𝑛 > 2, state 𝑘 is SEQ stable for DM 𝑖 if all the opposing 
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DMs 𝐍\{𝒊} can sanction all the UIs of 𝑖 from 𝑘 using UIs that will move 𝐍\{𝒊} to a more 
preferred state 𝑣, where 𝑣 is less preferred for 𝑖 than 𝑘.  SEQ stability considers two steps in 
the future, requires knowledge of self and opponent’s preference rankings, and satisfices the 
focal DM with respect to the outcomes.  
Definition 2.2 For 𝑖 ∊ 𝐍, a state is sequentially stable (SEQ) for DM 𝑖, expressed as  𝑘 ∊
𝑺𝑖
𝑆𝐸𝑄
, iff for every  𝑘1 ∊ 𝐴𝑖
+(𝑘), there exists at least one  𝑘2 ∊ 𝐴𝐍\{𝒊}
+ (𝑘1 ) with 𝑘 ⪰𝑖 𝑘2. 
2.1.2.3 General Metarational Stability 
The GMR solution concept is formally defined in Definition 2.3 (Howard, 1971; Fang et al., 
1989; Fang et al., 1993; Xu et al., 2018) which explains that state 𝑘, in an n-DM model 
where 𝑛 > 2, is GMR stable for DM 𝑖 if all the remaining DMs 𝐍\{𝒊} can sanction all the 
UIs of 𝑖 from 𝑘 by UMs to another state 𝑣 which is less preferred for 𝑖 than 𝑘.  GMR stability 
is similar to SEQ stability; however, it does not require UIs for the DMs 𝐍\{𝒊}. GMR stability 
considers two moves in the future, requires knowledge of self-preference rankings only, and 
avoids all risks. 
Definition 2.3 For 𝑖 ∊ 𝐍, a state is general metarational (GMR) for DM 𝑖, denoted by  𝑘 ∊
𝑺𝑖
𝐺𝑀𝑅, iff for every  𝑘1 ∊ 𝐴𝑖
+(𝑘) there exists at least one 𝑘2 ∊ 𝐴𝐍\{𝒊}(𝑘1 ) with 𝑘 ⪰𝑖 𝑘2.  
2.1.2.4 Symmetric Metarational Stability 
The SMR solution concept is formally described in Definition 2.4 (Howard, 1971; Fang et 
al., 1989; Fang et al., 1993; Xu et al., 2018). This stability definition is similar to GMR but 
with an addition that allows the focal DM to consider an alternative to escape harm caused 
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by the opponents’ sanction.  Thus, state 𝑘 in a n-DM model, where 𝑛 > 2, is SMR stable iff 
DMs 𝐍\{𝒊} can sanction all the UIs of 𝑖 from 𝑘 using UMs to another state 𝑣, such that 𝑣 is 
less preferred for 𝑖 than 𝑘, and such that there are no UIs for 𝑖 to escape from 𝑣.  SMR 
stability studies three moves in the future, requires knowledge of self-preference rankings, 
and avoids all risks. 
Definition 2.4 For 𝑖 ∊ 𝐍, a state is symmetric metarational (SMR) for DM 𝑖 denoted by  
𝑘 ∊ 𝑺𝑖
𝑆𝑀𝑅 ,  iff for every 𝑘1 ∊ 𝐴𝑖
+(𝑘) there exists at least one 𝑘2 ∊ 𝐴𝐍\{𝒊}(𝑘1 ), such that 
𝑘 ⪰𝑖 𝑘2 and 𝑘 ⪰𝑖 𝑘3 for all 𝑘3 ∊ 𝐴𝑖 (𝑘2 ). 
When stability has been determined for every state for all the DMs, the equilibria of the 
model follow.  A state is an equilibrium under a stability concept if it is stable under that 
stability concept for all the DMs in the conflict. This idea can be expressed formally as in 
Definition 2.5 
Definition 2.5 A state 𝑘 ∊ 𝐒 is an equilibrium state under a specific solution concept, if  𝑘 
is stable for all DMs in the model under the same solution concept.  E is the set of all 
equilibria in the conflict.  
If 𝐸 ∊ E then the values of 𝑡𝑁𝑎𝑠ℎ(𝐸), 𝑡𝑆𝐸𝑄(𝐸), 𝑡𝑆𝑀𝑅(𝐸), 𝑡𝐺𝑀𝑅(𝐸) identify the type of 
equilibrium. See Chapter 3 for details. 
2.2 Summary 
The GMCR methodology is a well-established tool for analyzing real world disputes and 
predicting its possible resolutions. A conflict model within the GMCR approach constitutes 
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mainly of relative DMs in the conflict and the options they control, a set of feasible states, 
and the state preference order of the DMs in the conflict. It analyzes the conflict based on 
solution concepts, or behaviors under conflict, such as Nash, SEQ, SMR and GMR. The 
GMCR approach enhances the DMs understanding of the conflict and allows them to take 
more informed decisions in resolving conflicts.  
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Chapter 3 
Methodology: Option Effectiveness 
The GMCR approach has been shown to be a robust and effective method to analyze disputes 
and conflicts involving two or more DMs (Fang et al., 1993; Xu et al., 2018).  Previous 
studies conducted by Alhindi et al. concluded that options could, in fact, be used as means to 
influence the conflict and reach a more desirable resolution (Alhindi et al., 2017a, 2017b, 
2018b).  Therefore, knowing the effectiveness and importance of the options available at 
hand for the DMs would allow a better understanding of the conflict’s direction and where it 
is heading in order to resolve it.  The present research proposes a novel approach to measure 
options effectiveness which relies on stability analysis using GMCR (Alhindi et al., 2018a, 
2018c). This approach is only usable subsequent to the stability analysis.  GMCR model has 
to be used first in order to conduct Nash, SEQ, GMR, and SMR Stability analyses of the 
conflict, which will identify the equilibria states.  Then, the strength of each equilibrium state 
can be calculated.  The strengths of the equilibria are then used to measure the option 
effectiveness.  The following subsections explain the method of calculating the strength of 
an equilibrium and the option effectiveness.  The procedure for Option Effectiveness is 
delineated in Fig. 3.1.  
This chapter includes published contents from “A Measure for Option Effectiveness in the 
Graph Model for Conflict Resolution” (Alhindi et al., 2018a) and “Option Effectiveness in 
Conflict Resolution” (Alhindi et al., 2018c) © 2018 IEEE. 
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Figure 3.1 Procedure for calculating the Option Effectiveness 
3.1 Strength of Equilibria 
For measuring the strength of the identified equilibria, a simple weighting technique is 
proposed.  This approach is inspired by the work of Matbouli, Kilgour, and Hipel (2015) in 
measuring the robustness of an equilibrium.  The strength of each equilibrium is calculated 
by assigning weight points for each equilibrium state according to the solution concept that 
has identified it as being an equilibrium.  Certain fundamentals of GMCR are defined before 
calculating the strength of the equilibria: 
• Equilibrium States: Let the set of all equilibria in a conflict be represented by 𝑬 =
 {𝐸1,   𝐸2, … , 𝐸𝑦, … ,  𝐸𝑌}, where 𝐸𝑦 is the is the 𝑦
𝑡ℎ equilibrium state and 𝑌 is the total 
number of equilibrium states in a conflict. 
• Equilibrium State representation in terms of the solution concepts: an equilibrium state 
𝐸𝑦 is represented by the set 𝐸𝑦 = (𝑡𝑁𝑎𝑠ℎ, 𝑡𝑆𝐸𝑄 , 𝑡𝑆𝑀𝑅 , 𝑡𝐺𝑀𝑅), where:  
𝑡𝑁𝑎𝑠ℎ = {
1, 𝑖𝑓 𝐸𝑦 𝑖𝑠 𝑎𝑛 𝑒𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑏𝑟𝑖𝑢𝑚 𝑢𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑟 𝑁𝑎𝑠ℎ
0, 𝑜𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑤𝑖𝑠𝑒
, 
GMCR model stability 
analysis 
Calculation of Strength 
of the Equilibria
Option Effectiveness 
calculation
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𝑡𝑆𝐸𝑄 = {
1, 𝑖𝑓 𝐸𝑦 𝑖𝑠 𝑎𝑛 𝑒𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑏𝑟𝑖𝑢𝑚 𝑢𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑟 𝑆𝐸𝑄
0, 𝑜𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑤𝑖𝑠𝑒
, 
𝑡𝑆𝑀𝑅 = {
1, 𝑖𝑓 𝐸𝑦 𝑖𝑠 𝑎𝑛 𝑒𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑏𝑟𝑖𝑢𝑚 𝑢𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑟 𝑆𝑀𝑅
0, 𝑜𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑤𝑖𝑠𝑒
, 
𝑡𝐺𝑀𝑅 = {
1,   𝑖𝑓 𝐸𝑦 𝑖𝑠 𝑎𝑛 𝑒𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑏𝑟𝑖𝑢𝑚 𝑢𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑟 𝐺𝑀𝑅
0,   𝑜𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑤𝑖𝑠𝑒
 
Once all the equilibria states are defined with respect to the stability concepts, one can 
calculate the strength of an equilibrium state 𝐸 by using Equation 3.1 
 𝑆𝑇𝑅(𝐸𝑦) = [(𝑡𝑁𝑎𝑠ℎ × 4) + (𝑡𝑆𝐸𝑄 × 3) + (𝑡𝑆𝑀𝑅 × 2) + ( 𝑡𝐺𝑀𝑅  × 1)] (3.1) 
Therefore, 𝑆𝑇𝑅(𝐸𝑦) is a numerical representation of the equilibrium strength.  In this 
approach, the Nash equilibrium is considered the strongest solution concept, and is given 
four points since there are no UIs by which the focal DM can consider moving to a more 
preferred state.  The SEQ equilibrium has been ranked 2nd in terms of equilibria strength and 
is assigned three points because the UIs of the focal DM can be sanctioned by UIs from the 
opponent.  The 3rd-ranked equilibrium is SMR, which is allotted two points, as it allows the 
focal DM the chance to escape the opponent’s sanction.  The weakest equilibrium states are 
the ones which are GMR equilibrium and they are given one point, because the GMR stability 
considers the UMs only for the focal DM and for the opponent by which he or she can 
sanction the focal DM’s UMs, and unlike the SMR stability, GMR stability does not allow 
the chance to escape a sanction.  It can be noticed that the strength of an equilibrium state 
cannot exceed 10 points.  A tabular representation for calculating the equilibrium is proposed 
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which makes it easier for an analyst to perform the calculation and the comparison among 
the equilibria.  Table 3.1, which is named “Equilibrium Strength”, shows the proper structure 
of the tabular representation of the equilibrium strength calculation in GMCR.  The equilibria 
of the model are listed row-wise below the “Equilibrium” heading in Table 3.1.  The 
equilibrium representations, in terms of the solution concepts, are listed from the 2nd to the 
5th column of the table.  The last column in Table 3.1 shows the strength of the equilibrium 
state which is calculated by Equation 3.1.  Furthermore, Table 3.2 summarizes the points 
allocation criteria for the equilibrium state with respect to the solution concepts that found 
the state as an equilibrium.  
Table 3.1 Strength of Equilibria (Alhindi et al., 2018c), © 2018 IEEE 
Equilibrium 
Equilibrium representation using the solution 
concepts 
Strength of Equilibrium 
Nash (4) SEQ (3) SMR (2) GMR (1) 
𝐸1 𝑡𝑁𝑎𝑠ℎ(𝐸1) 𝑡𝑆𝐸𝑄(𝐸1) 𝑡𝑆𝑀𝑅(𝐸1) 𝑡𝐺𝑀𝑅(𝐸1) 𝑆𝑇𝑅 (𝐸1) 
𝐸2 𝑡𝑁𝑎𝑠ℎ(𝐸2) 𝑡𝑆𝐸𝑄(𝐸2) 𝑡𝑆𝑀𝑅(𝐸2) 𝑡𝐺𝑀𝑅(𝐸2) 𝑆𝑇𝑅 (𝐸2) 
⋮ ⋮ ⋮ ⋮ ⋮ ⋮ 
𝐸𝑌 𝑡𝑁𝑎𝑠ℎ(𝐸𝑌) 𝑡𝑆𝐸𝑄(𝐸𝑌) 𝑡𝑆𝑀𝑅(𝐸𝑌) 𝑡𝐺𝑀𝑅(𝐸𝑌) 𝑆𝑇𝑅 (𝐸𝑌) 
A state that has been identified as Nash equilibrium is also considered SEQ, SMR, and 
GMR equilibrium, while a state that is SEQ equilibrium is also recognized as GMR 
equilibrium and often, but not always, as SMR equilibrium. Moreover, a state that is SMR 
equilibrium is always a GMR equilibrium too. Figure 3.2, which is based on a figure in an 
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article authored by Fang et al. (1989), shows a Venn diagram that illustrates the 
aforementioned relationships among the equilibrium types. 
 
Figure 3.2 Relationships among equilibrium types 
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Table 3.2 Criteria for point assignment to each equilibrium state for measuring its strength 
(Alhindi et al., 2018c), © 2018 IEEE 
Solution concept that 
identified the state as 
an equilibrium 
Points 
allotted 
Explanation 
Nash 4 
4 strength points are given if the state is found to be Nash 
equilibrium 
SEQ 3 
3 strength points are assigned if the state is found to be SEQ 
equilibrium 
SMR 2 
2 strength points are allocated if the state is found to be SMR 
equilibrium 
GMR 1 
1 strength point is given if the state is found to be GMR 
equilibrium 
3.2 Option Effectiveness 
The information gained by calculating the strength of the equilibria allows a general 
understanding of the conflict and the possibility of an equilibrium to occur in real life.  
Moreover, it is also of great importance to understand the conflict at the option level, since 
the options are the basic unit on which a GMCR model is built.  The Option Effectiveness 
aims to provide information about the contribution of each option towards the equilibria of 
the model, which would ultimately help the DMs to understand the conflict better and allow 
them to rank the options in terms of their effectiveness and importance in a dispute.  However, 
prior to the Option Effectiveness calculation, certain fundamentals must be defined: 
• Set of options in a conflict model: the set of options is {𝑂1,  𝑂2, … , 𝑂𝑚, … ,  𝑂𝑀}. 
• Options of an equilibrium: Equilibrium state 𝐸𝑦  can be expressed as 
𝐸𝑦 =  {𝑎𝑦1,  𝑎𝑦2, … , 𝑎𝑦𝑚, … ,  𝑂𝑦𝑀}  where 
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𝑎𝑦𝑚 = {
1, 𝑖𝑓 𝑂𝑝𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝑚 𝑖𝑠 𝑠𝑒𝑙𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑒𝑑
0, 𝑜𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑤𝑖𝑠𝑒
, 
𝐸𝑦 is the equilibrium state,  𝑂𝑚  is the 𝑚
𝑡ℎ option, which may be selected or not under 
𝐸𝑦, and 𝑀 is the total number of options available.  
Once the strengths of the equilibria have been calculated and the aforementioned 
fundamentals established, one can calculate the effectiveness of each option.  The procedure 
is to sum up the strengths of the equilibrium states used to select a given option.  A tabular 
representation is suggested in order to ease the process of Option Effectiveness computation.  
Table 3.3 is a general representation of the Option Effectiveness calculation where the 
equilibrium states are listed row-wise and the options are listed column-wise.  The last 
column of the table shows the strength of the equilibria row-wise, calculated by Equation 
3.1, and the last row shows the Option Effectiveness column-wise. In Table 3.3 
The option effectiveness, denoted by 𝐸𝐹𝐹 (𝑂𝑚), can be calculated by Equation 3.2.  The 
values obtained using this equation are used to fill in the cells in the last row of Table 3.3 for 
each option next to “Option Effectiveness”.   
 𝐸𝐹𝐹 (𝑂𝑚) = ∑ 𝑎𝑦𝑚
𝑌
𝑦=1
 𝑆𝑇𝑅(𝐸𝑦) (3.2) 
When the Option Effectiveness has been computed, one can rank the options in a model 
from most important to least important in descending order, such that the options that have 
higher effectiveness values are more important than the options with lower effectiveness 
 24 
values.  A tie between options in terms of effectiveness values is possible and indicates that 
these options have similar importance.  
Table 3.3 Tabular form of the Option Effectiveness approach (Alhindi et al., 2018c), © 
2018 IEEE 
 𝑂1 𝑂2 … 𝑂𝑀 
Strength of 
Equilibrium 
𝐸1 𝑎11 𝑎12 … 𝑎1𝑀 𝑆𝑇𝑅 (𝐸1) 
𝐸2 𝑎21 𝑎22 … 𝑎2𝑀 𝑆𝑇𝑅 (𝐸2) 
⋮ ⋮ ⋮  ⋮ ⋮ 
𝐸𝑌 𝑎𝑌1 𝑎𝑌2 … 𝑎𝑌𝑀 𝑆𝑇𝑅 (𝐸𝑌) 
Option Effectiveness 𝐸𝐹𝐹 (𝑂1) 𝐸𝐹𝐹 (𝑂2) … 𝐸𝐹𝐹(𝑂𝑀)  
3.3 Summary 
The Option Effectiveness approach is developed and designed in this thesis as an expansion 
to the GMCR methodology. The procedure determines the importance or impact of each 
option based on its selection within each equilibrium state in the conflict model, as well as 
the types of solution concepts, or behavior under conflict, that form the equilibria. More 
specifically, the strength of an equilibrium type from strongest to weakest is Nash, SEQ, 
SMR, and GMR. Based on this, the effectiveness or impact of a given option is computed 
according to its presence in each equilibrium state. This permits the options to be ranked 
according to their importance or effectiveness in resolving the dispute under consideration. 
The Option Effectiveness procedure enhances a given DM’s understanding of the impacts of 
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the options in the conflict, and in turn allowing the DM to focus his or her efforts in selecting 
options that will have a larger influence in resolving the conflict. 
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Chapter 4 
Shifting Paradigms in the Global Political and Economic Arena 
The achievement of superpower status has been the goal of many countries around the globe 
and is the underlying reason for the conflict between China and the United States (US) over 
global trade agreements.  The conflict is thoroughly investigated in Chapter 5.  However, to 
reach a sound understanding of the nature of this conflict, one needs to understand the 
political history of these two nations.  This chapter explains the aftermath of World War II 
and the US path to global dominance, as well as the struggles of China in the mid-1900s and 
its actions to improve its economy.  
4.1 The Emergence of the United States as a Global Superpower 
The US began to emerge as a superpower long before World War I (WWI).  The main 
contributing factor was the economic drive and expansion of the US.  America’s geographical 
presence played a vital role in its economic expansion.  American soil was rich in minerals 
and oil, and great for agriculture and later for industrial production.  This paved the way for 
international trade and commerce, which caused US ideologies, beliefs, and culture to be 
transferred across the world (Mead, 2002, p. 103).  Consequently, proceeds from trade were 
used to strengthen US defense, particularly the navy, which was helpful in transporting its 
produce internationally.  Furthermore, this wealth was accompanied with advanced 
technological innovation, research and development, which led to increased production and 
enhanced output quality, further improving the economic capabilities of the US (Abramovitz 
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& David, 1973).  As a result, rising US economic prosperity and national security enabled its 
leaders to undertake crucial local and international projects that were implemented through 
the use of “soft power”, resulting in US dominance in world politics (Efthymiou, 2013).  
The US did not strengthen its military capacities to actively participate in world conflicts, 
but rather to prevent other nations from challenging the US militarily (McDougall, 1997).  
Many saw the US as being a patrolling agent that would use its military might only as a force 
of good.  Its leaders used mediation and soft power to further American interests and deter 
conflicts amongst other nations, reinforcing its leadership and giving the US an edge in 
international diplomacy (Efthymiou, 2013).   
An example of the point made above can be seen in the US reluctance to participate in 
WWI.  It took three years for the US to join in the war, predominantly because Germany’s 
naval-based warfare threatened US trade with Britain and France, and strained American 
banks that had loaned substantial funds to Britain (Stevenson, 2004, p. 318; Schulzinger, 
2008, p. 63).  The US aim in WWI was to bring an end to the war, victory to its allies and 
peace to the world, and to establish a foundation for the League of Nations to safeguard 
American interests.  The outcome of WWI demonstrated US supremacy, leading to its 
recognition as a global superpower.  Its aid to the Allies, without which victory would have 
been unachievable, gave it a leading role in international affairs, particularly in European 
(Stevenson, 2004, p. 319; Efthymiou, 2013).  
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With WWI coming to an end, most Americans were of the opinion that participating in 
international affairs would be detrimental to America’s economy, and thus the US adopted a 
policy of isolationism, a national policy that would keep the US from engaging in politically 
and militarily complicated affairs.  The US followed this policy throughout the 1920s up to 
World War II (WWII).  As a result of this policy, America’s political relations in Latin 
America improved tremendously (Weisberger et al., 2018).  Despite political tensions in 
Europe, America persisted in its isolationist policy.  In 1935, Congress passed the Neutrality 
Act, which barred the supply of munitions to belligerent countries, whether they were the 
target or the attacker.  The same course of international policy was also maintained in the 
Pacific region, where America continued to refrain from intervening in Japan’s invasion of 
China in 1937.  Instead, it continued to focus on peace-building and defense, strengthening 
its navy and establishing security treaties with the other North and South American 
governments (Weisberger et al., 2018).  
However, as the world drew closer to the rise of another world-wide catastrophe after the 
invasion of Poland in 1939 by Germany, known as WWII, America was compelled to revise 
its neutrality act, and with the defeat of France in 1940 by Germany, it decided to supply 
armaments to the Allies, specifically Britain and France, on a cash and carry basis.  In fact, 
the topic of the quantity of arms to be supplied to the Allies became a bone of contention 
during the US election in 1940, which was won by the incumbent, Franklin Roosevelt.  As 
Roosevelt returned to office, he passed Lend-Lease legislation in March of 1941 which 
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further guaranteed US aid to the Allies on credit and which was also later extended to the 
Soviet Union, making the US an undeclared war participant (Weisberger et al., 2018).  
Moreover, the situation in the Pacific, in regard to Japan’s involvement in the war, made 
US participation in the war ever more likely.  Although the US had always supported China, 
at the same time it was supplying Japan with commodities such as scrap metal, gas, lubricants 
etc. that were crucial in Japan’s war against China.  Thus, in order to support China against 
Japan, the US loaned funds to China and banned the supply of scrap metal and all other types 
of commodities to Japan that would prove helpful in producing munitions.  From that point 
in time, US relations with Japan deteriorated, as a series of events unfolded depicting Japan’s 
retaliation.  The biggest example of this involved Japan joining hands with Germany and 
Italy and the subsequent surprise attack at Pearl Harbor which left the US with more than 
three thousand casualties and confirmed the US belief that participation in the war was 
unavoidable.  Thus, the US formally declared war on Japan, and Germany and Italy 
responded by declaring war against the US (Weisberger et al., 2018).  
Although the US officially declared war when Pearl Harbor was attacked, it was not 
adequately prepared for it.  President Roosevelt along with his advisors had been able to 
devise military plans, but due to lack of public support, sufficient expenditures had not been 
allocated to the production of weaponry except for the navy, whose size was inadequate to 
fight a two-ocean war.  Nonetheless, the situation improved later in the war, when more than 
15 million people were hired in defense services, and resources were reallocated to 
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augmenting the production of the defense industry.  Consequently, an Office of War 
Mobilization was founded to oversee the defense industry.  The supply of raw materials was 
redirected towards supporting defense production, and gradually other industries were set up 
such as for synthetic rubber.  Moreover, the Office of Price Administration was also 
established to monitor inflation levels.  Eventually, by 1944, the defense industry flourished 
and arms production more than doubled the capabilities of all the opposing nations combined.  
Furthermore, from the technological aspect, breakthroughs were made, and innovative 
products were developed such as radar, sonar, rockets, proximity fuses, and most importantly 
the atomic bomb (Weisberger et al., 2018).  
Socially conditions improved as well, as unemployment declined drastically, with 
employment figures reaching 53 million by 1945, leading to a shortage of manpower.  The 
Fair Employment Practices Committee was also founded, abolishing racial discrimination 
and giving equal rights to everyone to participate in defense services, which further enhanced 
production.  As such, near-zero unemployment led to higher income levels, which ultimately 
translated into economic prosperity for the country (Weisberger et al., 2018).  
US involvement in WWII carved a new role for it in the domain of international affairs, as 
it led to termination of the isolation policy and brought about the establishment of the United 
Nations (UN) in 1941 by President Roosevelt and Prime Minister Winston Churchill, which 
was an extension of the cooperation of the 26 Allied nations during the war.  Backed with 
public support for the UN, planning for the post-war structure of the UN went ahead.  
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Eventually, on October 24th, 1945, 50 nations collaborated to lay the foundation for a 
permanent United Nations, pledging the US’s commitment to a global organization with 
sufficient authority to maintain an “everlasting” peace.  The UN is headquartered in New 
York City and is a successor to the former League of Nations, which was established during 
WWI and later terminated in 1946, displaying a shift of world power from Europe to the 
United States of America (Weisberger et al., 2018).  
Besides the establishment of a united political charter, the UN, President Roosevelt also 
encouraged economic collaboration through the creation of the two most significant 
international financial bodies in the world, the World Bank and the International Monetary 
Fund (IMF), at the Bretton Woods conference, the purpose of which was to eradicate the 
culture of economic nationalism which placed the interests of one nation above all others 
(Wan, 2016, p. 60; Weisberger et al., 2018).  
The next subsection explains how the US was able to maintain its global supremacy 
through utilizing the World Bank and the IMF to its political and economic advantage.  
4.1.1 The World Bank and the International Monetary Fund 
The World Bank is associated with the UN, and provides financial assistance to member 
countries as well as developing countries by funding projects that are vital to their local 
economic prosperity.  It also aids developing countries with the creation of economic policies 
and reorganization of their government institutions, and is responsible for setting the global 
economic agenda.  The IMF is also affiliated with the UN and works in collaboration with 
 32 
the World Bank (Chossudovsky, 2018; What We Do, n.d.).  According to the official IMF 
website, “the primary purpose of IMF is to ensure the stability of the international monetary 
system—the system of exchange rates and international payments that enables countries (and 
their citizens) to transact with each other” (About the IMF, n.d., “Why the IMF was created 
and how it works” para. 2).  Both the World Bank and the IMF are headquartered in 
Washington DC, and are together known as the Bretton Woods Institutions.  
The location of the headquarters of the two largest international financial agencies in the 
world expresses the magnitude of the influence the United States has on their operations.  
This was one of the issues that the nations participating at the Bretton Woods conference 
disagreed upon.  As noted by Catherine Gwin, “the United States has viewed all multilateral 
organizations, including the World Bank, as instruments of foreign policy to be used for 
specific U.S. aims and objectives” (Gwin, 1997, p. 195).  The US Treasury desired for the 
headquarters to be located in the capital, Washington DC, which was close to the US 
Congress, as opposed to the other participating nations, which favored New York City as the 
better location due to its future proximity to UN headquarters.  Initially, John Maynard 
Keynes, a renowned British economist, proposed London as a suitable location for the 
headquarters of World Bank and IMF; however, the US Secretary of the Treasury at the time, 
Henry Morgenthau, was smart enough to persuade the other foreign delegations present at 
the conference that locating the headquarters of the new financial institutions close to an 
already established leading financial center of the world, the City of London, would cause it 
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to be dominated by the British Empire.  Hence, Washington DC was looked upon as the ideal 
location for the global financial institutions, situated close to the White House (Toussaint, 
2014a).   
Relatedly, the US Treasury also ensured that the members of the Board of Directors of the 
World Bank were permanent residents in Washington DC, an idea which was greatly opposed 
by Keynes, who suggested that this would cause the US government to exercise unnecessary 
influence over its members.  As argued by Gwin,  
throughout the history of the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development 
(the World bank), the United States has been the largest shareholder and the most 
influential member country. U.S. support for, pressure on, and criticisms of the Bank 
have been central to its growth and the evolution of its policies, programs, and 
practices. (1997, p. 195)  
Also, Gwin (1997) commented that “the top management of the Bank spends much more 
time meeting with, consulting, and responding to the United States than it does with any other 
member country. Although this intense interaction has changed little over the years” (p. 248).  
Moreover, Toussaint (2014a) argued that the US government has proposed the candidate to 
be elected as the president of the World Bank, which is a decision always supported by the 
Board of Directors, since a representative of another member state has never been given 
consideration by the Board (Toussaint, 2014a).    
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Furthermore, although reconstruction of the nations that were destroyed by WWII had been 
the primary motive for why the Bank was created, nonetheless, the US government 
announced the launch of the Marshall Plan (officially the European Recovery Program) to 
regulate the lending operations of the World Bank (Toussaint, 2014a).  In order to better 
understand this notion, one must peek further into the events of 1920.  At the end of WWI, 
the Treaty of Versailles was signed at the Paris Peace Conference, which accused Germany 
of being responsible for the War (MacMillan, 2002).   
As compensation for the destruction WWI had caused, Germany became heavily indebted 
to Belgium, Britain, and France, who were in turn indebted to the United States and thus 
relied heavily on Germany to pay its debts so they could repay their own debts to the US.  
This led to the onset of a worldwide economic recession whereby Wall Street crashed in 
1929, causing Germany to default on its debts to the Allies and they to in turn default on their 
US loans, leading to the Great Depression.  Therefore, in order to avoid another economic 
catastrophe after WWII, the US created the Marshall Plan, which was an initiative to offer 
funds in the form of grants and not loans to European countries to help rebuild their 
economies.  This initiative would then help the US to maintain the full employment level that 
was achieved during the war years due to the astronomical growth of its defense industry, 
and also uphold the level of international trade.  As a result, through the World Bank, the US 
between 1948 and 1951 offered grants worth more than 13 billion US dollars to help 
reconstruct 17 European economies, which translates to 120 billion US dollars as of today in 
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approximate terms, upon the condition that the funds be used to purchase US-produced goods 
as opposed to those of its communist rival, the Soviet Union (Toussaint, 2014b).  In fact, the 
first loan by the World Bank was made to France on the condition from the US that the 
French Communist Party (FCP) be eliminated from the French government.  Soon after the 
FCP was forced out of the government, a loan of 250 million US dollars was made available, 
exhibiting the influence US could exercise over the Bank’s policies (Toussaint, 2014a).  
Since the inception of the World Bank until the present day, US has possessed veto rights 
at the World Bank and has always taken measures to retain its power.  An example of this 
can be seen in the situation the US was presented with in 1987 when Japan demanded an 
increase in it voting rights.  The US responded by reducing its own voting rights; however, 
it raised the majority required to exercise influence over the Bank’s policies to 85% as 
opposed to the previously 80%.  In doing so, the US was able to preserve its veto rights while 
meeting the demands of Japan, which placed it ahead of both Germany and Great Britain 
(Toussaint, 2014a).  Currently, US holds 15.98% of the voting power, which still suffices for 
the purpose of maintaining its veto power (World Bank, 2018).  
Another argument that demonstrates the US’s attempts to utilize the Bank for its own 
interests is present in the measures it takes to protect its economy from foreign competition.  
From the 1970s, the US has been successful in persuading the Bank to avoid loaning funds 
that would generate competition for US goods and services such as palm oil, sugar, and citrus 
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fruits, and in 1987 loans to steel manufacturers in both India and Pakistan were greatly 
curtailed in favor of the US economy (Toussaint, 2014a).   
Conclusively, the presence of the World Bank is not only utilized as an instrument of 
foreign policy by the US, but it also provides favorable financial implications for the US.  
Since its inception, US contributions to the World Bank are estimated to be 1.85 billion US 
dollars, whereas the Bank’s lending have amounted to 218.21 billion US dollars in total 
(Toussaint, 2014a; Gwin, 1997, pp. 271-272).  As further estimated by Gwin (1997), between 
the period 1947 to 1992, the income of the Bank raised through the issuance of World Bank 
bonds to US citizens amounted to 20.2 billion US dollars while the outlay within the US 
amounted to 11 billion US dollars (pp. 271-272).  This clearly demonstrates that US firms in 
particular have largely benefitted from these loans (Toussaint, 2014a).  
In recent years the US had been working on the Trans Pacific Partnership (TPP) 
Agreement, a trade agreement to stimulate trade by reducing tariffs among participating 
countries (Ablow, 2016).  Negotiations regarding the TPP started under the Obama 
administration, but US involvement in the TPP came to an end when President Donald Trump 
withdrew the US from it in 2017 (Evans, 2017).  The US withdrawal from the TPP caused a 
vacuum on the global economic stage and might have paved the way for China to succeed as 
the next global economic leader through China’s own international trading agreements, 
which will be covered in the next section of this chapter (Wong, 2017; Sink, Olorunnipa, & 
Curran, 2017). 
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For the last 100 years, the US has been able to maintain its predominance on the global 
stage, backed by the influence it is capable of exerting through the World Bank and the IMF 
as well as its military might. However, that predominance is being challenged by the 
economic, technological, and military emergence of China, which might overshadow the 
global supremacy of the US in the future. 
4.2 China’s Rise and Its Emergence as a World Superpower in the 21st Century 
For many centuries prior to the 18th, China was recognized as the biggest economic 
superpower in the world.  Hence, it can be considered that China is only re-emerging, in the 
21st century, to its rightful place on the global stage.  For instance, in 1078 China produced 
what is estimated to be 125,000 tons of steel compared to Britain’s production, in year 1788, 
of 76,000 tons.  China was also leading technological innovation in the textile industry seven 
centuries prior to Britain’s textile revolution in the 18th century, and China was ahead of 
many nations in the trading sector with its advanced navigation systems, consisting of trade 
networks reaching Europe, Africa, South Asia, and the Middle East, which helped in the 
transportation of its innovative goods such as paper, weapons, book printing, and tools, 
making it a manufacturing superpower.  As well, China’s agricultural industry was second to 
none until the 18th century.  China also controlled a fleet of commercial ships considered to 
be the world’s largest at the time, able to carry 3,000 tons of goods in 1588, whereas Britain’s 
ships could only displace 600 tons by the end of the 18th century.  The Chinese at one time 
possessed around 130,000 private transport ships, and China matched Great Britain’s per 
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capita income due its robust banking industry and the high returns from the agricultural sector 
(Hobson, 2004, pp. 51-73).  China’s esteemed economic status was unchallenged until the 
end of the 19th century (Petras, 2012).  
China suffered the most from British and Western colonization of the East, which was of 
a militaristic nature.  These colonizing nations followed a scheme of non-equal economic 
relations, and dominated opposition by military force whereas China’s prosperity was 
achieved by its belief in reciprocal benefits in its trading relations (Gott, 2011).  However, 
failing to dominate the Chinese market by economic competition, Britain used its military 
power to force its goods on China and enforcing non-reciprocal deals to lower the tariffs on 
its goods.  This resulted in British opium, produced in India, to overflow in China, despite 
Chinese law forbidding imports of narcotics.  Consequently, the Chinese suffered from the 
Opium Wars with the British and millions hence being enslaved by opium.  As the Chinese 
rulers failed to realize the military strength of the colonizing countries, China’s esteemed 
economic status met its end.  As for the militaristic aspect, the British secured their 
dominance over China through the enormous militarization of its economy, which was 
dependent on resources apprehended from its massive colonies (Hobson, 2004).  The 20th 
century was devastating for China as not only had it lost its global supremacy to the West, 
but most of its population was suffering from poverty and destitution.  Furthermore, its main 
ports were in the possession of Western countries, whereas the countryside was ruled by cruel 
and immoral warlords (Petras, 2012). 
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The beginning of China's remarkable new rise can be traced back to the year 1945, when 
China achieved its independence following the defeat of Japan by the US at the end of World 
War II.  At the time, the leadership of China was mainly divided between Mao Zedong’s 
Communist Party and the Kuomintang regime of Chiang Kai-shek; this situation elevated 
concerns over a new civil war (Bernstein, 2015; Kamrany & Jiang, 2015).  A civil war broke 
out in 1946 between the Communists and the Kuomintang, in which Mao and his communist 
party emerged victorious in 1949. On October 1st, 1949 the People's Republic of China was 
founded by Mao marking the beginning of the one-party government in China (BBC, n.d.; 
Yu, 2015).  The Communist Party’s regime worked on eradicating countryside warlords and 
gangster rule, stopping the advantages of Western imperialists, and chasing down the rich 
owners of blacklisted businesses such as brothels and drug- and people-trafficking.  The 
Chinese revolution under the Communist government was crucial in forging the current state 
of China (Petras, 2012).  The economic reforms were initiated by the new leaders under the 
“Great Leap Forward” program aimed towards improving industrial and agricultural 
productivity through mobilizing labour in order to uplift the devastated Chinese economy. 
This resulted in a huge decline leading to massive casualties, and in turn, the program was 
abandoned (BBC, n.d.).  
The start of 1980 marked the beginning of a new era where communist China shifted its 
economic policy towards a more capitalism-oriented one.  In the coming decades, China 
would open its market to foreign investment and privatize many state-owned industries.  In 
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addition, the Chinese leadership embraced the idea of transferring technical knowledge by 
providing a low-cost workforce for overseas firms. The leniency towards a capitalist 
economic vision allowed China’s economy to prosper rapidly. The continued growth of 
China’s manufacturing industry was a product of public investment, technological 
advancement, and a firmly regulated domestic market in which both local and foreign 
investment would be profiting.  The Chinese government’s bold export policy and the 
liberalization of the Chinese market made China one of the major exporters in the world 
(Petras, 2012).   
The importance of the US was evident to China, and in the 1980s, it became the main 
destination for its exports (Jacques, 2012, p. 179).  In 2007, China had an unprecedented 
trade surplus resulting in China becoming one of the biggest creditors in the world (Hirst, 
2015; Petras, 2012). In order to continue its economic dominance, China required 
procurement of raw materials in huge quantities, which resulted in China investing overseas 
and partnering in international trade agreements focusing on nations in Latin America and 
Africa.  China has maintained its policy of not interfering in the internal affairs of its trading 
partners, contrary to the policy followed by its rival, the US (Petras, 2012).  Furthermore, 
China has started to participate in international financial organizations.  For instance, it joined 
the IMF and the World Bank in 1980 (Wan, 2016, p. 62) and the Asian Development Bank 
(ADB) in 1986 (Wan, 2016, p. 68).  However, with China being a communist country and so 
viewed as suspicious by the US, delayed its participation in the World Trade Organization 
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(WTO) by almost 15 years, and after finalizing the most detailed agreements of any country, 
China was able to join the WTO (Jacques, 2012, p. 178). 
In the last three decades, China’s gross domestic product growth rate has averaged about 
9% annually (Husna, 2018).  Meanwhile, it continues to invest in energy and mineral sectors 
throughout Africa.  China has also been replacing US- and European-led international 
financial institutions such as the IMF and the World Bank as the principle lender (Petras, 
2012).  As a result, Chinese influence in the last decade has grown to be tangible and real 
rather than a set of statistics and speculations (Jacques, 2012, p. 409). 
4.2.1 Chinese Global Economic Initiatives 
In 2013, China formally initiated the idea of establishing an international bank that would 
finance infrastructure projects around Asia and the world, named the Asian Infrastructure 
Investment Bank, involving 57 countries in which China was the largest shareholder (About 
AIIB Overview - AIIB, n.d.; Wan, 2016, pp. 44, 75).  The AIIB along with China’s ever-
growing economic power is considered a direct challenge to the US and Japan, rivaling the 
World Bank, the IMF, and the ADB, and increasing Chinese influence in Asia and the World 
(Wan, 2016, p. 11).  Some consider that the idea of establishing the AIIB was driven by the 
grand Chinese plan of the Belt and Road (B&R), formally known as the One Belt One Road 
(OBOR) initiative (Wan, 2016, pp. 51-52).  Moreover, China’s voting share in the AIIB is 
around 26%, permitting it to exercise veto rights in the bank’s decisions, as 75% of total 
voting shares are needed to pass important actions (Wan, 2016, p. 50).  Moreover, China’s 
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veto rights could be revoked in the case that more countries, such as the US and Japan, joined 
the AIIB (Mie, 2016; Wan, 2016, p. 50).  The bank’s primary focus is to finance projects 
launched by the B&R (Mitrovic, 2018).  
The B&R initiative, launched in 2013, involves more than 65 counties and a collective 
population of 4.4 billion people.  Its objective is to develop connectivity in five main areas: 
people, currency, trade, infrastructure, and policy, with priority assigned to the development 
of transportation networks including seaports, roads, and railways (Mitrovic, 2018).  
Building infrastructure for connectivity of energy is another area of focus for the Belt and 
Road initiative (Mitrovic, 2018).  The initiative aims to connect Southeast Asia with Western 
Europe through Chinese infrastructure, which will supposedly stimulate economic growth 
across China, Asia, and the globe (Cheng, 2018; Mitrovic, 2018).  The term “Belt” refers to 
the Silk Road Economic Belt, similar to the ancient silk road, stretching all over Eurasia 
(Cheng, 2018).  The “Road” is the 21st-century Maritime Silk Road intended to connect China 
to the Mediterranean Sea (Cheng, 2018).  It is estimated that China is willing to invest 150 
billion US dollars annually into the B&R initiative (Phillips, 2017). In fact, analysts are 
indicating that this initiative has the capability to overshadow the US Marshall Plan post-
World War II (“China’s One,” 2016).  
Recently, China has also been engaged in the launch of the Regional Comprehensive 
Economic Partnership (RCEP) Agreement, which involves US allies such as South Korea 
and Japan and is intended to be the world’s largest free-trade agreement (Brinkley, 2017).  
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The agreement focuses on free trade and lower tariffs among participating countries 
(Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP), 2016; Regional Comprehensive 
Economic Partnership, n.d.; Mathieson, 2017).  
Backed by the highest foreign currency reserves in the world, valued in excess of 3.1 
trillion US dollars (Picardo, 2018; IMF Data, n.d.), the AIIB, B&R, and the RCEP 
agreements will enable China’s vision to emerge as the strongest economic power in the 
world, surpassing the US, is clear, and its objectives to achieve that are in motion.  One can 
only wait and see how the future will unfold and whether the US will be able to retain its 
supremacy over China.  
4.3 Summary 
The US has emerged as an economic and military global superpower since after WWII. It 
established global financial institutions such as the IMF and the World Bank to demonstrate 
its global economic influence. However, China’s unprecedented economic rise through its 
economic reforms that started in the 1980s allowed it to challenge the US supremacy. It 
launched its own led financial institution, the AIIB, and a unique global initiative the B&R 
connecting Southeast Asia with Western Europe to increase global trade through massive 
infrastructure investment. The Chinese are also working on implementing the RCEP trade 
agreement to increase its economic dominance. The US withdrawal from the TPP at the start 
of 2017 may have paved the way for China to act as a global economic leader. However, it 
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is yet to be seen how the future will be revealed and whether China will be able to overshadow 
US dominance.  
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Chapter 5 
The Conflict Between China and the US over Global Trade Agreements 
In recent years, China has surprised the world with its economic and military rise.  This rise 
has put the United States (US) status as the world’s strongest economic superpower in 
jeopardy.  China is clearly in line to at least share this status with the US, if not claiming 
solely for itself (Ahmed, 2011).  It all started when China announced an initiative to launch 
a financial institution named the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB) along with its 
complementary initiative the Belt and Road (B&R), which would rival the US-influenced 
World Bank and the Asian Development Bank (ADB),  The Regional Comprehensive 
Economic Partnership (RCEP) is another agreement that China is working on in parallel, 
which is expected to be the world’s largest free trade agreement (Brinkley, 2017).  It involves 
16 countries including China and Japan (Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership, 
n.d.).  Interesting facts about China’s continued rise include China becoming the world’s 
second-largest economy in 2010 just behind the US, and China becoming the biggest US 
creditor in recent years.  As for the military aspect, China’s military spending reached more 
than 45 billion dollars in 2007 (“Timeline: U.S. Relations,” n.d.).  However, the US had plans 
of its own such as the Trans Pacific Partnership (TPP) Agreement, a trade agreement focusing 
on increasing trade by lowering tariffs among participating countries. Negotiations regarding 
the TPP started under the Obama administration, but US involvement in the TPP came to an 
end when President Donald Trump withdrew the US from it in 2017. The trade war between 
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China and the US was ignited when the Trump administration put forward an act to enforce 
tariffs, estimated to be in the region of 60 billion US dollars, on Chinese imports (Breuninger 
& Tausche, 2018), whereas China countered the act by threatening to impose tariffs on US 
imports (Thomas & Wiseman, 2018). 
The trade dispute between China and the US is of great importance, and a thorough 
investigation of this conflict would allow a better understanding of global politics and 
international economics.  The conflict is studied using the Graph Model for Conflict 
Resolution (GMCR) methodology to gain critical understanding and clarity about the 
possible resolutions of this dispute.  Examination of the AIIB, TPP, and RCEP initiatives is 
the main focus of the analysis, as both China and the US are heavily involved in dialogue 
with each other regarding them, whereas the B&R initiative is removed from the conflict 
model since it does not involve the US.  
The investigation of this conflict uses the idea of the Option Effectiveness approach as an 
extension to the GMCR methodology, which was explained in Chapter 3.  The approach is 
applied to this conflict as means of evaluating the novel method.  As mentioned earlier, the 
Option Effectiveness approach allows the examination of options, which allows DMs to rank 
these options according to their importance in contributing to the resolutions predicted by 
GMCR.  This would, ultimately, permit the DMs to make more informed strategic decisions.  
The background of the trading conflict between China and the US is discussed in Section 
5.2, while the methodology followed in the study is explained in Section 5.3.  The modeling 
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and analyses for the three phases of the conflict are presented in Sections 5.4, 5.5, and 5.6.  
The application of the Option Effectiveness approach on the three phases of the conflict is 
shown in Section 5.7, and overall strategic insights are then revealed in Section 5.8.  
This chapter of the thesis includes contents from published and unpublished manuscripts 
“The Conflict Over the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank Involving China, USA, and 
Japan” (Alhindi et al., 2017b) © 2017 IEEE, “Option Effectiveness in Conflict Resolution” 
(Alhindi et al., 2018c) © 2018 IEEE and “The Conflict over Global Trade Agreements 
Between China and the United States” (Alhindi et al., 2018b). 
5.1 Conflict Background 
The expanding economic and military strength of China have established it as a rising world 
superpower.  China became the biggest US creditor in September 2008, indicating that China 
is the largest US debt-holder at around 600 billion US dollars (“Timeline: U.S. Relations,” 
n.d.).  Furthermore, China became the second-ranked economy of the world in 2010, valued 
at 1.33 trillion US dollars (“Timeline: U.S. Relations,” n.d.).  In fact, Mr. Jim O'Neill, the 
head of Goldman Sachs Asset Management, expects China to surpass the US as the largest 
economy in the world by 2027 (Ahmed, 2011).  In parallel to its economic growth, China 
also increased its military expenditure by 18% back in 2007, to reach overall spending of 
around 45 billion US dollars (“Timeline: U.S. Relations,” n.d.).  China is undoubtedly a 
highly influential nation in East Asia, where it dominates economically, and it is extending 
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its control over the South China Sea.  When its economy surpasses that of the US and its 
military strength further increases, China will clearly be established as a global superpower.    
The trade conflict between the US and China is considered as a long-term and time-
evolving conflict in this research (Matbouli, Kilgour, & Hipel, 2015), and is divided into 
three phases.  The first phase is when China and its partners establish the AIIB and the US 
and Japan apply counter-moves.  The second part is when the US considers launching the 
TPP and offers terms to China over the AIIB. The third phase comes after US President 
Trump entered the Oval Office in early 2017, followed by his withdrawal of the US from the 
TPP and China’s commitment to launching the RCEP.  In the second phase, a hypergame 
model is used to capture misperceptions by both DMs: China, and the US and Japan. 
5.1.1 Implementation of AIIB prior to US Terms 
The proposal to establish the AIIB was officially made by China in October 2013.  It was 
widely acknowledged and encouraged both regionally and globally (Wong, 2016).  However, 
the US has strongly opposed the idea as it fears that its Chinese counterpart would use the 
bank as means to set its own economic schemes and agendas globally (Perlez, 2015).  
Therefore, the US and Japan lobbied their allies against joining the AIIB (Perlez, 2015).  
However, this lobbying was not effective, as many of their allies, including the United 
Kingdom, France, Germany, and Italy, joined the AIIB, which was officially launched in 
October 2014 (Goh, 2014; Huang, 2015; “France, Germany, Italy to,” 2015).  
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5.1.2 Introduction of TPP and US Terms for China over the AIIB  
China is considered one of the world’s fastest-emerging superpowers, especially after the 
establishment of the AIIB, which allowed it increased influence in the Asia-Pacific region 
(Perlez, 2015).  This rapid influence gain for China is a major concern for the US and Japan 
(Perlez, 2015).  Hence, the US, led by Obama at the time, and its allies in the region wanted 
to bind their economic relationships further.  The TPP, a regional trade agreement, emerged 
as the binding instrument (Ablow, 2016).  The TPP agreement involves open trade and low 
tariffs among the twelve contributing nations (Ablow, 2016).  The TPP was perceived to be 
of major significance by the Obama administration to help the US economy and gain further 
influence over the Asia-Pacific region (Ablow, 2016).  Also, it was considered as a key factor 
in reducing the ever-growing Chinese influence over the region (Ablow, 2016).  However, 
some experts believe that the TPP agreement may actually prove beneficial to China, as it 
will improve economic prospects in the region (Wang, 2016). 
The AIIB is interpreted by the US, Japan, and other nations as being a direct competitor to 
the world’s current leading organizations and banks, such as the International Monetary Fund 
(IMF) (About the IMF, n.d.), the World Bank (What We Do, n.d.), and the ADB (Who We 
Are, n.d.).  The US and Japan are major shareholders and DMs in these organizations (Asian 
Development Bank, 2015; “IMF Members' Quotas,” 2018; World Bank Group, 2015), and 
hence, having another competitor like the AIIB would adversely affect the influence of the 
US and Japan through these organizations. 
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According to The Financial Times, the US in 2015 declared a truce in its campaign to block 
the Chinese-led AIIB (as cited in Donnan, 2015).  However, while the US maintained its 
decision to not join the AIIB, it claimed that it had received assurances from China that China 
would address US doubts regarding the AIIB.  These assurances included that China would 
increase its grants and investments to the World Bank.  China also committed to the AIIB 
functioning under proper environmental and governance standards (Donnan, 2015). 
The membership of the US and Japan in the AIIB is, in fact, a threat to China (Mie, 2016).  
Kawai, from University of Tokyo, expects that the US and Japan joining the AIIB may block 
China from its veto rights in the organization since the duo would have around a 20% voting 
share (Mie, 2016).  Instead, to impact decisions in the organization, China would have to rely 
on its alliance with Russia, which controls about 5% of the voting share (Mie, 2016).  
5.1.3 Post-Obama Era and Implementation of RCEP 
In January 2017, after winning the US presidential election in November 2016, the Trump 
administration decided to withdraw from the TPP by signing an Executive Order (Evans, 
2017).  This order created a void and made it possible for another trading entity to emerge 
and to fill the leadership role in global trade (Sink et al., 2017).  In fact, this trading entity 
can be China since it has the capability of filling the void caused by the US withdrawal from 
the TPP (Sink et al., 2017). 
The US withdrawal from the TPP allowed China to expand its influence in the Asia-Pacific 
region (Wong, 2017), which it is actively doing.  As stated by Zhang Jun, an economic affairs 
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official at the Chinese foreign ministry, “If China has taken up a leadership role, it is because 
the front-runners have stepped back, leaving that place to China” (as cited in Sink et al., 
2017).  The implementation of the RCEP would undoubtedly strengthen the Chinese 
leadership role.  Other countries that were participating in the TPP may have no other choice 
but to join the RCEP in order to benefit from other trade agreements after the collapse of the 
TPP (Brinkley, 2017).  
The RCEP is a trade agreement that involves sixteen nations including China and Japan 
(Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP), 2016; Regional Comprehensive 
Economic Partnership, n.d.).  This agreement excludes the US because the US was promoting 
its own trade agenda, the TPP, which collapsed under the Trump administration, as just 
mentioned.  
China has also launched the Belt and Road (B&R) initiative, an ambitious program running 
parallel to the RCEP (Jin, 2017).  The Belt and Road initiative focuses on infrastructure 
investments in massive transportation systems linking China with other nations by roads, 
railways, airports, and sea navigation, as well as building economic ties among the 
participating countries by encouraging market integration (Jin, 2017).  The Belt and Road 
initiative will allow further Chinese dominance on a global scale.  
5.2 Methodology 
The formal strategic investigation of the conflicts arising over trading agreements in the Asia-
Pacific region is divided into three key periods of time.  The first involves the establishment 
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of the AIIB prior to the announcement of the US terms.  The second is concerned with the 
inclusion of the US stipulations in the AIIB and the founding of the TPP as a counter-move 
by the US and Japan.  The possibility of misperceptions occurring at this time is also 
considered in what is called a hypergame analysis.  Within the third time period, the evolution 
of the conflict into the era of the Trump administration in early 2017 is studied by removing 
the launch of the TPP by the US and including the implementation of the RCEP by China. 
For a given point in time, each phase of the conflict is separately modeled and analyzed 
using GMCR (Fang et al., 1993; Kilgour & Hipel, 2005; Kilgour & Hipel, 2010; Xu et al., 
2018).  In the modeling stage, what has to be determined first are the DMs holding real 
decision-making power in the conflict, plus each DM’s courses of action or options, 
representing their power.  The second step is to establish the relative state rankings of each 
DM in terms of feasible states or scenarios which could arise based on the DMs decidisions 
about which option to select.  A well-established approach for ranking these states is the 
option prioritization method, which satisfies all the rules of first-order logic (Fang et al., 
2003a, 2003b).  By knowing the possible moves and counter-moves that each DM could 
make in a conflict, one can carry out what is called stability analysis for a given state using 
a range of solution concepts, which include Nash (Nash, 1950; Nash, 1951), SEQ (Fraser & 
Hipel, 1979, 1984), GMR (Howard, 1971), and SMR (Howard, 1971) stability, which are 
explained thoroughly in Chapter 2 of this thesis.  Stability analysis of a conflict allows a DM 
to understand whether it is beneficial for the DM to move to a more preferred situation.  
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Following the novel approach explained in Chapter 3, the strength of the equilibria and 
Option Effectiveness can be calculated after the stability analysis of a conflict, which permits 
ranking of the options with respect to their contributions towards the equilibrium states of 
the model, thereby allowing the DMs a better understanding of the options and their 
importance.  
5.3 Implementation of the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank prior to United States 
Terms 
As mentioned earlier, the conflict is divided into three phases in time.  The first phase starts 
when China establishes the AIIB, preceding the time when the US proposes its terms 
concerning the AIIB.  The stability analysis is carried out by building the conflict model for 
the first phase.  The model is based on several key factors that have to be determined and 
identified.  First, a point in time is considered.  Then, the DMs involved and the options they 
control are identified, the DMs’ relative preferences are determined, and the reversible and 
irreversible moves are clarified.  This section thoroughly explains the model construction in 
the first phase of the conflict followed by the stability analysis. 
5.3.1 Conflict Model for First Phase 
5.3.1.1 Point in Time  
The conflict started in October 2013 when China proposed the launch of the AIIB.  However, 
the model constructed for the first time period considers February 2014 as the point in time 
at which to study the conflict.  By this date, the US counter-move to oppose the AIIB had 
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been already revealed and tension over it was growing between China on the one side, and 
the US and Japan on the other. 
5.3.1.2 Decision-Makers  
China and the US and Japan are the key DMs in the conflict.  Moreover, the background of 
the conflict reveals that the US and Japan have a mutual interest in the conflict and possess 
similar options.  Hence, the pair is considered as a single DM.  The conflict model, therefore, 
only considers two main DMs: China and the US.  Accordingly, the other DMs who may 
have played a vital role in establishing the AIIB in terms of joining the AIIB and contributing 
to its capital even against the will of the US and Japan, like France, Germany, Italy, and the 
United Kingdom (“France, Germany, Italy to,” 2015), have been excluded from the model. 
5.3.1.3 Decision-Makers’ Options  
The options at this point in time are summarized in Table 5.1, which explains the options that 
each DM controls in the conflict. 
Table 5.1 First phase DMs’ options 
DM # Options Explanation 
China 1  Establish the AIIB 
Formation of the AIIB by China and participating members while 
functioning under the best environmental and governance standards. 
US 
2  Join the AIIB 
The participation of the US and Japan in the AIIB could result in 
nullifying the veto rights of China in the organization. 
3  Oppose the AIIB 
The US and Japan will lobby and influence their allies against joining 
the AIIB. 
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5.3.1.4 Option Form  
The conflict at this stage consists of three options, for which China controls one option and 
the US two, as listed in Table 5.2.  Each option can either be chosen or not selected, and 
therefore the conflict has 23 = 8 mathematically possible scenarios or states.  Scenarios or 
states which cannot occur in the real world are referred to as infeasible states and should be 
removed from the model.  Often, infeasibilities can be expressed in terms of options, which, 
as explained later, are used to define states.  Some sets of options are mutually exclusive so 
that at most only one from a set can be selected.  Other infeasibilities can be expressed using 
what is called option interdependencies.  The infeasibilities of the first phase of the AIIB 
conflict will now be explained.  
a. The United States:  
o Option 2 and Option 3 are mutually exclusive, as the US cannot join the AIIB 
while it opposes the AIIB at the same time.  
b. China – The United States:  
o Joining the AIIB or opposing it for the US is dependent on China establishing 
the AIIB.  
After removing the infeasible situations expressed in terms of options, four feasible states 
remain in the model, as indicated by the columns containing Ys and Ns given in Table 5.2.  
The option form, illustrated in this table, is used to represent these states within the GMCR 
model.  Each state in the model constitutes a unique set of selected and unselected options.  
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A chosen option is assigned the entry ‘Y’ in Table 5.2 and an unselected option is assigned 
the entry ‘N’.  For example, State 4 in Table 5.2 can be represented by the state written 
horizontally in text as (Y N Y), in which China decides to establish the AIIB (as indicated 
by the Y opposite Option 1), the US does not join the AIIB (as shown by the N opposite 
Option 2) and the US opposes the AIIB (as expressed by the Y against Option 3).  The four 
states are numbered in the top row of Table 5.2 simply for the convenience of easily referring 
to them.  Hence, the numbers are labels and have no quantitative meaning.  The ranking of 
states shown in the lower part of the table orders every state from most preferred on the left 
to least preferred to the right for each DM in terms of their preferences, which are based on 
option prioritization statements described in the next sub-section.  
Table 5.2 First phase option form 
DM #  States (Ordered) 1 2 3 4 
China 1 Establish the AIIB N Y Y Y 
US 
2 Join the AIIB N N Y N 
3 Oppose the AIIB N N N Y 
 
5.3.1.5 Decision-Makers’ Preferences:  
The goal for any rational DM in a conflict is to reach the most preferred scenario or state by 
appropriately exercising the options it controls.  Often a DM may prioritize one option over 
another in terms of choosing it or not selecting it over the duration of the conflict.  In other 
situations, a DM’s selection of options in terms of its importance may be conditional upon 
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what another DM does.  Assuming ordinal preferences, whereby states are ranked from most 
to least preferred with ties allowed, a simple algorithm takes the hierarchical preference 
statements and converts them to a ranking of states or preference rankings for a given DM.  
This approach is referred to as Option Prioritization (Fang et al., 2003a, 2003b).  Often, after 
obtaining the initial states’ ranking from the option prioritization approach, a manual sorting 
of the states is required to reach the final states’ ranking order.  The manual sorting allows 
the analyst to reach a ranking of states which would be similar to reality.  However, manual 
sorting was not required for the first phase.  
The ranking of states for each DM allows the determination of the UIs in the conflict from 
each state with respect to that DM.  “UI” is a term explicitly used for referring to a move that 
will improve the DM’s situation by shifting the conflict to a more preferred state than the 
current one for the DM that controls the UI.  However, “UM” is a general term to express all 
the available moves from a given state.  Therefore, all the UIs fall under the UMs, but the 
opposite is not true.  
The option prioritization approach shown in Table 5.3 prioritizes each option based on 
preference statements.  These statements are prioritized in Table 5.3 from most prioritized at 
the top to least prioritized at the bottom.  A preference statement may include more than one 
option in which these options are conditionally prioritized.  Table 5.3 shows the option 
prioritization for this conflict.  The third column shows the short form of the preference 
statement as entered in GMCR II software.  A positive number means that the option is 
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selected, while a negative number reflects that the option is unselected.  For example, the 
short form of Statement #1 for China, which has Option 1 as selected and Options 2 and 3 as 
not selected, can be written as 1 & -2 & -3.  The preference statement for each DM is shown 
in the fourth column of the table, with their priority rankings shown in the third column.  For 
convenience, each statement has been numbered in the second column of the table. 
Table 5.3 First phase option prioritization for each DM 
DM # 
Short form of 
the preference 
statements 
Preference Statements Comments 
China 
1 1 & -2 & -3 
Establishing the AIIB while the 
US does not exercise any 
counter-move 
China will gain influence through the 
establishment of the AIIB, although 
this influence can be affected 
negatively if the US joins or opposes 
the AIIB.  
2 3 IF 1 The US to oppose the AIIB 
China prefers that the US keeps 
opposing the AIIB rather than joining 
the AIIB. 
3 2 IF 1 
The US and Japan to join the 
AIIB 
This option might nullify the veto 
rights of China, and that is why it is the 
least prioritized option. 
US 
4 -1 China to remain at status quo  
The US prefers that China does not 
take any action. 
5 3 IF 1 
Oppose the AIIB if China 
establishes the AIIB 
This action may result in fewer 
participants in the AIIB, reducing 
Chinese influence in the region.  
6 2 IF 1 
Join the AIIB if China 
implements the AIIB  
China’s veto rights in the AIIB could 
be revoked, given that the US and 
Japan join the AIIB together. 
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Table 5.4 First phase preference ranking of states for China 
DM # Options Strategies 
China 1 Establish the AIIB Y Y Y N 
US 
2 Join the AIIB N N Y N 
3 Oppose the AIIB N Y N N 
State Ranking China 2 4 3 1 
 
Table 5.5 First phase preference ranking of states for the US 
DM # Options Strategies 
China 1 Establish the AIIB N Y Y Y 
US 
2 Join the AIIB N N Y N 
3 Oppose the AIIB N Y N N 
State Ranking US 1 4 3 2 
The state rankings shown in Tables 5.4 and 5.5 for China and the US respectively are the 
final product of the option prioritization method.  For example, State 2 in Table 5.4 is the 
most preferred for China since it is well aligned with Statement 1 in Table 5.5, while State 1 
is considered the least preferred because maintaining the status quo for the Chinese 
contradicts the priorities set by Statements 1, 2, and 3.  
5.3.1.6 Reversible and Irreversible Moves:  
The identification of reversible and irreversible moves, once an option is selected, is essential 
in the stability analysis, since the irreversible moves cancel out the UI or UM for any state 
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that can be achieved by withdrawing the selection of an option.  The following assumptions 
are made for the DMs with respect to option reversals if they are selected. 
• China: The move to select Option 1 (i.e., establishing the AIIB) is irreversible because 
withdrawal from a large organization, having almost US 100 billion dollars in capital, 
is assumed to be difficult and tends to require complicated procedures. 
• The US: 
o The decision to implement Option 2 (joining the AIIB) is irreversible, as capital 
withdrawal from a large and controlled organization such as the AIIB is a difficult 
process since it may require voting from members.  
o The action of selecting Option 3 (opposing China over AIIB) is reversible, which 
is an independent move.  The US may stop opposing the AIIB if its conditions 
are met, which will be further explained in later phases of the conflict. 
5.3.2 Stability Analysis of the First Phase 
A rational DM will look to improve his or her position in a conflict.  This can be done through 
option selections or counter-moves.  For instance, if the conflict is currently in status quo, 
which is State 1 in Table 5.2, China would be tempted to improve its position through a UI 
to State 2 by establishing the AIIB.  As such, the conflict will be in a temporary situation at 
State 2, at which the US can sanction China’s UI via its own UIs through either selecting 
Option 2 or 3, which will shift the conflict to either State 3 (reached by opposing the AIIB) 
or State 4 (reached by joining the AIIB).  However, it is most likely that the US will choose 
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State 4 over State 3 since State 4 is more preferred than State 3.  States 3 or 4 are the likeliest 
resolution of the conflict at this stage since China has no way to escape these states to a more 
preferred state as it does not have the means to do so.  Another thing to note is that China 
prefers State 3 and 4 more than State 1 for any given case, which makes it very likely that 
China will make the move to select Option 1, establishing the AIIB.  Similarly, the GMCR 
method can be used as a formal approach to study the conflict in a comparable manner.  The 
GMCR methodology uses the Nash, SEQ, GMR, and SMR solution concepts to determine 
the possible resolutions of the conflict.  These solution concepts conduct a thorough analysis 
of the model with respect to the UIs and the UMs for every state under each DM.  Tables 5.6 
and 5.7 show the individual stability analyses for China and the US respectively, and Table 
5.8 shows the equilibrium states obtained through the analyses using the GMCR approach.  
Table 5.8 reveals that States 3 and 4 are strong equilibrium states, since they are Nash, SEQ, 
GMR, and SMR equilibria.  Therefore, the conflict may end up in one of these states.  Table 
5.8 also shows that State 2 is Nash stable for China; therefore, China cannot take any UI to 
reach a more preferred state, while the US has a UI to States 3 and 4, which are considered 
the equilibrium states for the conflict. 
Section 5.2 reveals that ever since China proposed and then implemented the AIIB, the US 
has opposed and lobbied against it, which represents State 4 in the model.  Moreover, if the 
move to join the AIIB is reversible for the US and Japan, then State 4 is the only equilibrium 
predicted by the analysis. 
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Table 5.6 First phase individual stability analysis with respect to China 
DM #  States (Ordered) 1 2 3 4 
China 1 Establish the AIIB N Y Y Y 
US 
2 Join the AIIB N N Y N 
3 Oppose the AIIB N N N Y 
Individual 
Stability 
 Nash - ✓ ✓ ✓ 
 SEQ - ✓ ✓ ✓ 
 GMR - ✓ ✓ ✓ 
 SMR - ✓ ✓ ✓ 
 
 
Table 5.7 First phase individual stability analysis with respect to the US 
DM #  States (Ordered) 1 2 3 4 
China 1 Establish the AIIB N Y Y Y 
US 
2 Join the AIIB N N Y N 
3 Oppose the AIIB N N N Y 
Individual 
Stability 
 Nash ✓ - ✓ ✓ 
 SEQ ✓ - ✓ ✓ 
 GMR ✓ - ✓ ✓ 
 SMR ✓ - ✓ ✓ 
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Table 5.8 First phase stability analysis 
DM #  States (Ordered) 1 2 3 4 
China 1 Establish the AIIB N Y Y Y 
US 
2 Join the AIIB N N Y N 
3 Oppose the AIIB N N N Y 
State Ranking 
 China 2 4 3 1 
 US 1 4 3 2 
Equilibria 
 Nash  -  - ✓ ✓ 
 SEQ  -  - ✓ ✓ 
 GMR  -  - ✓ ✓ 
 SMR  -  - ✓ ✓ 
5.4 Introduction of the Trans Pacific Partnership agreement and the United States 
Terms for the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank 
The conflict between China and the US over global trade agreements was categorized into 
three phases.  This section carries out a thorough study of the second phase in the conflict 
where three new options in total are introduced in the GMCR model.  The US has new options 
in terms of proposing the terms for China over the AIIB and the launch of the TPP agreement, 
while China is only limited to either accepting or rejecting the US terms over the AIIB.  The 
model in this phase is constructed and analyzed based on the methods mentioned and used in 
the first phase.  A hypergame analysis (Aljefri, Fang, & Hipel, 2014; Aljefri, Bashar, Fang, 
& Hipel, 2017), which allows misperceptions, is applied in the second phase with regard to 
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the implementation of the TPP, since there are claims that the DMs are misperceiving the 
effect of the TPP.  
5.4.1 Model of Second Phase 
5.4.1.1 Point in Time:   
By February 2016 the information about the launch of the TPP agreement was revealed and 
the US terms for China over the AIIB were publicized.  Therefore, the point in time of the 
second phase of the conflict is considered as February 2016. 
5.4.1.2 Decision-Makers:  
The DMs from the first phase of the conflict, i.e., China and the US, are carried into the 
second phase, since the presented study is only concerned with the US and China.  Although 
there might be other DMs who may play a role in the conflict, for the sake of simplicity they 
are not considered at this point.  
5.4.1.3 Decision-Makers’ Options:  
The second phase of the conflict introduces a new option for China, which is accepting the 
US terms over the AIIB, while two more options are introduced for the US, which are 
launching the AIIB and proposing US terms for China over the AIIB.  Table 5.9 lists all the 
options that each DM controls along with the explanation of each option.  
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Table 5.9 DMs’ options (Alhindi et al., 2017b), © 2017 IEEE 
DM # Options Explanation 
China 
1 Establish the AIIB Refer to Table 5.1 
2 
Accept US terms over the 
AIIB 
The terms include increased contribution to the World Bank and 
governance of the AIIB to the highest standards 
US 
3 Join the AIIB Refer to Table 5.1 
4 
Request China to accept 
the terms 
The terms as mentioned in Option 2 
5 Oppose the AIIB Refer to Table 5.1 
6 Launch the TPP 
Establishment of the TPP by the US and the participating nations
  
5.4.1.4 Option Form of the Standard Model:  
The option form is used again for presenting the feasible states of the conflict at this stage, 
which are shown in Table 5.12.  The states constitute the selected and unselected options, 
where ‘Y’ is assigned for chosen options and ‘N’ is assigned for unchosen options.  Given 
that the conflict has 6 options at this stage, then there are 26 = 64 mathematically possible 
states in the conflict.  Table 5.12 lists the remaining 18 states (feasible states) after the 
removal of the infeasible states from the model.  For identifying the infeasible states in the 
second state of the conflict, the following is assumed for each DM. 
• China: China accepting the US terms over the AIIB, which is Option 2, is dependent 
on establishing the AIIB.  
• The United States: Option 3 and Option 5 are mutually exclusive. It is not possible 
for the US to join the AIIB while they keep opposing it.  
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• China - The United States:  
o Options 3, 4, and 5 (Joining the AIIB, Requesting China to accept the US terms 
over AIIB, and Opposing the AIIB and lobbying allies against joining it) are 
dependent on the formation of the AIIB by China.  
o China can only accept the US terms if the US offers them.  
o The US will not further oppose the AIIB if China accepts the terms.  
The top row of Table 5.12 orders the states of the conflict from 1 to 18.  The lower part shows 
the states’ preference rankings, which ranks the states from most preferred on the left to least 
preferred on the right for each DM.  These rankings are obtained through the use of the option 
prioritization method. 
5.4.1.5 Decision-Makers’ Preferences:  
The option prioritization method, shown in Table 5.10 for China and Table 5.11 for the US, 
is used for establishing the states’ preference rankings for each DM, which was explained 
earlier.  However, manual sorting of the initial states’ rankings was required for it to be well-
aligned with reality.  Tables 5.10 and 5.11 list the preference statement used to build the 
preference ranking for each DM respectively.  The lower part of Table 5.12 shows the 
preference ranking for each DM involved in the conflict from most preferred to the left to 
least preferred to the right.  The states shown in the same bracket in Table 5.12 are equally 
preferred.  For example, China’s state preference ranking is as follows: 2, 4 > 11 > 13 > 5 > 
8, 9 > 18, 17 >14 > 3, 6 > 1 >12, 15 > 7 > 16 > 10. 
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Table 5.10 China’s second phase option prioritization (Alhindi et al., 2017b), © 2017 IEEE 
# 
Short form of 
the preference 
statements 
Preference Statements Comments 
1 1 & -2 & -3 
Establishing the AIIB without 
accepting the US terms and the US 
and Japan do not join it. 
The formation of the AIIB promotes China’s 
influence regionally and globally. 
2 2 IF 4 
Accept US terms over establishing 
the AIIB when the US offers them. 
The increased contributions of China in the 
World Bank may appease the US since the US 
majorly influences it. 
3 -5 The US does not oppose the AIIB 
The opposition from the US may lead to lesser 
participants in the AIIB. 
4 -6 The US does not launch the TPP 
The launch of the TPP may reduce the Chinese 
influence in the region. 
 
 
 
Table 5.11 The US’s second phase option prioritization (Alhindi et al., 2017b), © 2017 
IEEE 
# 
Short form of 
the preference 
statements 
Preference Statements Comments 
1 -1 & 6 
China to remain at status quo and 
the US to launch the TPP 
The US prefers that China does not take any 
action, and the TPP will promote US influence 
in the region. 
2 2 IF 4 
China to accept the US terms over 
the AIIB when proposed by the US 
Increased contributions by China to the World 
Bank are preferred by the US, as the 
organization is highly influenced by it. 
3 5 IF -2 
Oppose the AIIB if China is not 
willing to accept the terms 
This action may result in lesser participants in 
the AIIB, reducing Chinese influence in the 
region. 
4 3 IF -2 Join the AIIB 
China’s veto right in the AIIB could be 
nullified, given that the US and Japan join the 
AIIB together. 
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5.4.1.6 Reversible and Irreversible Moves:  
In addition to the following assumptions for the option reversibility for each DM, the 
assumptions from the previous phase are also considered. 
• China: The choice of accepting the US terms over the AIIB (i.e., Option 2) is 
reversible. This action can be exercised by China without any dependencies on other 
DMs; therefore, reversing this action is solely China’s decision, which would mean 
that reversing it is a valid option for China. However, the consequences of reversing 
this move might possibly be very drastic. 
• The United States: 
o The decision to request China to accept the US terms (Option 4) is reversible, 
as it is an independent decision for the US, which would allow the possibility of 
reversing this action. 
o The action to launch the TPP (Option 6) is irreversible, since withdrawing from 
such an agreement is a long and difficult process, as it may require the approval 
of the US Congress.  
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5.4.2 Stability Analysis of the Second Phase  
The individual stability analysis for China and the US is shown in Tables 5.13 and 5.14 
respectively, and the equilibrium states obtained by the implementation of the Nash, SEQ, 
GMR, SMR solution concepts are shown in Table 5.15.  The analysis reveals that there is 
one weak equilibrium state (14) and six strong equilibria states (1, 5, 12, 15, 17, and 18).  
Moreover, since States 1 and 5 are SEQ equilibria and State 1 is the status quo at which the 
conflict will not have occurred, therefore State 5 can be considered as the most realistic and 
likely resolution of the conflict at this phase.  
The SEQ solution concept considers a state to be in equilibrium if the given state is SEQ-
stable for all the involved DMs.  A state is identified as being SEQ-stable when the focal DM 
cannot take advantage of a UI to improve their situation and move to a more preferred state 
because the opponent has the ability to sanction the UI.  As such, if the focal DM selects the 
Figure 5.1 SEQ stability analysis of state 5 with respect to China 
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move, then the conflict will end up in a less preferred state for the focal DM.  For example, 
if the conflict is at State 5, in Figure 5.1, China is tempted to improve its position in the 
conflict by reversing Option 2 by considering a UI to move to State 4, which is a more 
preferred state than State 5 for the Chinese.  However, if China moves to State 4 through its 
UI, then the US has the possibility of sanctioning the Chinese UI and moving to a state more 
preferred than State 4, US UIs from State 4 may lead to States 6, 8, 9, 15, 17, and 18 which 
are all less preferred than State 5 for China as shown in Figure 5.1.  Therefore, State 5 is 
SEQ-stable for China.  Figure 5.1 illustrates the SEQ stability for China. 
State 5 is also identified to be SEQ-stable for the US.  The US has a UI, by selecting the 
option to launch the TPP, to State 14, which is more preferred than State 5, as shown in 
Figure 5.2.  However, China has the capability of sanctioning this UI by unselecting Option 
Figure 5.2 SEQ stability analysis of state 5 with respect to the US 
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2 (i.e., accepting the US terms over the AIIB), which leads to a less preferred state for the 
US.  
 72 
Table 5.12 Second phase option form (Alhindi et al., 2017b), © 2017 IEEE 
DM # 
 States 
(Ordered) 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 
China 
1 
Establish the 
AIIB 
N Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y N Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 
2 
Accept the US 
terms over 
AIIB 
N N N N Y N Y N N N N N N Y N Y N N 
US 
3 Join the AIIB N N Y N N Y Y N N N N Y N N Y Y N N 
4 
Request China 
to accept the 
US terms over 
AIIB 
N N N Y Y Y Y N Y N N N Y Y Y Y N Y 
5 
Oppose the 
AIIB 
N N N N N N N Y Y N N N N N N N Y Y 
6 
Launch the 
TPP 
N N N N N N N N N Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 
State 
Ranking 
China [2 4] 11 13 5 [8 9] [17 18] 14 1 [3 6] [12 15] 7 16 10 
US 10 1 14 5 16 [17 18] 13 [12 15] [8 9] 7 6 11 3 [2 4] 
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Table 5.13 Second phase standard individual stability analysis for China 
DM 
#  States 
(Ordered) 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 
China 
1 
Establish the 
AIIB 
N Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y N Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 
2 
Accept US 
terms over 
AIIB 
N N N N Y N Y N N N N N N Y N Y N N 
US 
3 Join the AIIB N N Y N N Y Y N N N N Y N N Y Y N N 
4 
Request China 
to accept the 
US terms over 
AIIB 
N N N Y Y Y Y N Y N N N Y Y Y Y N Y 
5 
Oppose the 
AIIB 
N N N N N N N Y Y N N N N N N N Y Y 
6 
Launch the 
TPP 
N N N N N N N N N Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 
State 
Ranking 
China [2 4] 11 13 5 [8 9] [17 18] 14 1 [3 6] [12 15] 7 16 10 
US 10 1 14 5 16 [17 18] 13 [12 15] [8 9] 7 6 11 3 [2 4] 
Individual 
Stability 
Nash - ✓ ✓ ✓ - ✓ - ✓ ✓ - ✓ ✓ ✓ - ✓ - ✓ ✓ 
SEQ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ - ✓ ✓ - ✓ ✓ ✓ - ✓ - ✓ ✓ 
GMR ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ - ✓ ✓ - ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ - ✓ ✓ 
SMR ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ - ✓ ✓ - ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ - ✓ ✓ 
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Table 5.14 Second phase standard individual stability analysis for the US 
DM 
#  States 
(Ordered) 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 
China 
1 
Establish the 
AIIB 
N Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y N Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 
2 
Accept US 
terms over 
AIIB 
N N N N Y N Y N N N N N N Y N Y N N 
US 
3 Join the AIIB N N Y N N Y Y N N N N Y N N Y Y N N 
4 
Request China 
to accept the 
US terms over 
AIIB 
N N N Y Y Y Y N Y N N N Y Y Y Y N Y 
5 
Oppose the 
AIIB 
N N N N N N N Y Y N N N N N N N Y Y 
6 
Launch the 
TPP 
N N N N N N N N N Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 
State 
Ranking 
China [2 4] 11 13 5 [8 9] [17 18] 14 1 [3 6] [12 15] 7 16 10 
US 10 1 14 5 16 [17 18] 13 [12 15] [8 9] 7 6 11 3 [2 4] 
Individual 
Stability 
Nash - - - - - - - - - ✓ - ✓ - ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ 
SEQ ✓ - - - ✓ - ✓ - - ✓ - ✓ - ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ 
GMR ✓ - - - ✓ - ✓ - - ✓ - ✓ - ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ 
SMR ✓ - - - ✓ - ✓ - - ✓ - ✓ - ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ 
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Table 5.15 Second phase standard stability analysis – Equilibria (Alhindi et al., 2017b), © 2017 IEEE 
DM 
#  States 
(Ordered) 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 
China 
1 
Establish the 
AIIB 
N Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y N Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 
2 
Accept US 
terms over 
AIIB 
N N N N Y N Y N N N N N N Y N Y N N 
US 
3 Join the AIIB N N Y N N Y Y N N N N Y N N Y Y N N 
4 
Request China 
to accept the 
US terms over 
AIIB 
N N N Y Y Y Y N Y N N N Y Y Y Y N Y 
5 
Oppose the 
AIIB 
N N N N N N N Y Y N N N N N N N Y Y 
6 
Launch the 
TPP 
N N N N N N N N N Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 
State 
Ranking 
China [2 4] 11 13 5 [8 9] [17 18] 14 1 [3 6] [12 15] 7 16 10 
US 10 1 14 5 16 [17 18] 13 [12 15] [8 9] 7 6 11 3 [2 4] 
Equilibria 
Nash - - - - - - - - - - - ✓ - - ✓ - ✓ ✓ 
SEQ ✓ - - - ✓ - - - - - - ✓ - - ✓ - ✓ ✓ 
GMR ✓ - - - ✓ - - - - - - ✓ - ✓ ✓ - ✓ ✓ 
SMR ✓ - - - ✓ - - - - - - ✓ - ✓ ✓ - ✓ ✓ 
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5.4.3 Hypergame Investigation of the Second Phase 
Section 5.2 revealed that some analysts claimed that the implementation of the TPP agreement 
would be beneficial to China.  The TPP is a trade agreement which will eventually improve 
the economic prospects in the region, leading to an indirect benefit for China (Wang, 2016).  
Hence, the option of launching the TPP may prove to be a blessing in disguise for China, and 
that is the opposite of what is expected by both DMs.  Henceforth, both China and the US are 
misperceiving their own preferences in terms of the TPP.  The equilibrium states that result 
from the standard GMCR model investigation are valid only when genuine information 
regarding the effect of launching the TPP is not available for by the DMs.  However, once the 
information is exposed, these equilibrium states will be invalid.  Consequently, the conflict 
can be analyzed further by a hypergame model (Aljefri et al., 2014, 2017).  A first-level 
hypergame model could be used to analyze the conflict, since both DMs are misperceiving 
their own preferences.  For constructing the hypergame model, the option of launching the 
TPP is removed.  Meanwhile, for the remaining options, the point in time, feasible and 
infeasible states, option prioritization for each DM, and reversible and irreversible moves 
continue to be the same as in the standard model.  
5.4.3.1 Option Form:  
The hypergame model is created by removing all the states that have the TPP option selected, 
since the option of launching the TPP is assumed to be invalid if the US recognizes that it is 
beneficial to China.  Table 5.16 shows the option form of the hypergame, which consists of 
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9 states after removing the states where the option of launching the TPP is enabled.  The 
states’ preference rankings for each DM are listed in the lower part of Table 5.16, under the 
state's rankings, which are from most preferred to the left to least preferred to the right. 
Table 5.16 Second phase hypergame option form (Alhindi et al., 2017b), © 2017 IEEE 
  States 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
China 
Establish the AIIB N Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Accept the US terms over AIIB N N N N Y N Y N N 
US 
Join the AIIB N N Y N N Y Y N N 
Request China to accept the terms N N N Y Y Y Y N Y 
Oppose the AIIB  N N N N N N N Y Y 
State 
Ranking 
China [2 4] [8 9] 5 1 [3 6] 7 
US 1 5 [8 9] 7 6 3 [2 4] 
 
Table 5.17 Second phase hypergame individual stability analysis for China  
  States 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
China 
Establish the AIIB N Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Accept US terms over N N N N Y N Y N N 
US 
Join the AIIB N N Y N N Y Y N N 
Request China to accept the terms N N N Y Y Y Y N Y 
Oppose the AIIB  N N N N N N N Y Y 
Individual 
Stability 
 Nash - ✓ ✓ ✓ - ✓ - ✓ ✓ 
 SEQ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ - ✓ ✓ 
 GMR ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ - ✓ ✓ 
 SMR ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ - ✓ ✓ 
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5.4.3.2 Stability Analysis of the Hypergame:  
The model is investigated via the same solution concepts that were applied to study the 
standard model.  The individual stabilities are shown in Tables 5.17 and 5.18 for China and 
the US respectively.  Table 5.19 demonstrates the equilibrium states predicted by the stability 
analysis after the elimination of launching the TPP option from the game.  The results reveal 
that States 1, 5, 6, 8, and 9 are equilibrium states.  States 1 and 5 are also identified as 
equilibrium states from the standard model’s investigation, while States 6, 8, and 9 are new 
emerging equilibria.   
State 5 as shown in Table 5.19 is in SEQ, GMR, and SMR equilibrium.  The same results 
were obtained from the standard model’s analysis, which further confirms that State 5 is the 
most probable resolution for this phase of the conflict.   
Table 5.18 Second phase hypergame individual stability analysis for the US 
  States 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
China 
Establish the AIIB N Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Accept US terms over N N N N Y N Y N N 
US 
Join the AIIB N N Y N N Y Y N N 
Request China to accept the terms N N N Y Y Y Y N Y 
Oppose the AIIB  N N N N N N N Y Y 
Individual 
Stability 
 Nash ✓ - - - ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ 
 SEQ ✓ - - - ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ 
 GMR ✓ - - - ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ 
 SMR ✓ - - - ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ 
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Table 5.19 Second phase hypergame stability analysis – Equilibria (Alhindi et al., 2017b), 
© 2017 IEEE 
  States 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
China 
Establish the AIIB N Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Accept US terms over N N N N Y N Y N N 
US 
Join the AIIB N N Y N N Y Y N N 
Request China to accept the terms N N N Y Y Y Y N Y 
Oppose the AIIB  N N N N N N N Y Y 
State 
Ranking 
China [2 4] [8 9] 5 1 [3 6] 7 
US 1 5 [8 9] 7 6 3 [2 4] 
Equilibria 
 Nash - - - - - ✓ - ✓ ✓ 
 SEQ ✓ - - - ✓ ✓ - ✓ ✓ 
 GMR ✓ - - - ✓ ✓ - ✓ ✓ 
 SMR ✓ - - - ✓ ✓ - ✓ ✓ 
5.5 Post-Obama Era and Implementation of the Regional Comprehensive Economic 
Partnership 
The third phase of the conflict between China and the US over the global trade agreements 
considers the period after the election and inauguration of Mr. Trump as the president of the 
US.  Mr. Trump has signed an executive order to withdraw the US from the TPP, and the 
withdrawal of the US from the TPP has allowed China to emerge as the leader in global trade 
by the introduction of the RCEP agreement, as explained earlier in Section 5.2. 
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5.5.1 Model of Third Phase 
5.5.1.1 Point in Time:  
The point in time selected for the third phase is February 2017.  By this time, Mr. Trump is 
the president of the US and has decided to withdraw from the TPP, while China was already 
engaged in negotiations for implementing the RCEP among the participating countries.  
5.5.1.2 Decision-Makers:  
The key DMs, i.e., China and the US, in the third phase are essentially the same as the 
previous phases.  The background of the conflict section elaborated that Japan is, in fact, 
participating in the RCEP.  Therefore, in this stage, Japan has a different vision in terms of 
their relationship with China.  However, the option of joining the AIIB along with the US is 
still possible for Japan. 
Table 5.20 Third phase DMs’ options 
DM # Options Explanation 
China 
1 Continue the AIIB 
China continues the AIIB while maintaining the highest 
international environmental and governance standards. 
2 Launch the RCEP China and participating countries to implement the RCEP. 
US 3 Join the AIIB 
China’s veto right in the AIIB could be revoked, given that the 
US and Japan join the AIIB together. 
5.5.1.3 Decision-Makers’ Options:  
The options of establishing the AIIB by China and accepting the US terms over the AIIB, 
from the previous phase, are combined into a new option for China which is continuing with 
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the AIIB.  China has one more addition to the options it controls, which is launching the 
RCEP.  Moreover, the US has only one option at this point, which is joining the AIIB, as all 
other options from the previous phases are considered outdated.  Table 5.20 lists the options 
that each DM can exercise along with the explanation of each option. 
5.5.1.4 Option Form:  
The option form is used to present the six feasible states of the model in Table 14.  Similar 
to the option forms of the previous phases, the states have an entry of ‘Y’ for selected options 
and ‘N’ for unselected options.  The lower part of Table 5.21, under the state rankings, shows 
the preference rankings for each state from most preferred on the left to least preferred on the 
right, where the states within the same brackets are equally preferred (e.g., for the US, the 
ranking is as follows: 1> 2, 3 > 4 > 5 > 6, where States 2 and 3 are indifferent and have the 
same priority).  The feasible states were obtained after removing the infeasible states under 
the following assumption. 
• China – The United States 
o Joining the AIIB for the US is dependent on China continuing with the AIIB. 
Therefore, the states in which Option 1 is not selected and Option 3 is chosen 
are removed. 
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Table 5.21 Third phase option form  
DM #  States (Ordered) 1 2 3 4 5 6 
China 
1 Continue the AIIB  N  Y  N  Y  Y  Y 
2 Launch the RCEP  N  N  Y  Y  N  Y 
US 3 Join the AIIB  N  N  N  N  Y  Y 
5.5.1.5 Decision Makers’ Option Prioritization:  
The option prioritization approach, which was explained earlier in the first phase of the 
conflict, is used to identify the states’ preference rankings for each DM in the third phase, 
followed by manual sorting to mimic reality.  Table 5.22 represents the option prioritization 
for the DMs involved in the conflict in a similar manner to that mentioned for the first phase 
of the conflict.  Tables 5.23 and 5.24 show the preference rankings for China and the US in 
the third phase respectively.  
Table 5.22 Third phase option prioritization 
DM # 
Short form of 
the preference 
statements 
Preference Statements Comments 
China 
1 1 & 2 & -3 
China to continue the AIIB and 
launch the RCEP, and the US 
does not join the AIIB. 
Continuation of the AIIB and the 
launch of the RCEP will keep 
promoting China’s influence 
regionally and globally. 
2 3 The US to join the AIIB Refer to Table 5.1 
US 
4 -1 & -2 China to remain at status quo  Refer to Table 5.1 
5 -1 | -2 
China to continue the AIIB or 
launch the RCEP 
- 
6 1 & 2 
China to continue the AIIB and 
launch the RCEP 
- 
7 4 Join the AIIB Refer to Table 5.1 
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5.5.1.6 Reversible and Irreversible Moves:  
The options in the third phase are all related to establishing or joining organizations and 
partnerships.  Actions to withdraw or pull out from these organizations and partnerships are 
difficult and have lengthy and complicated processes.  Therefore, all the moves in this phase 
are assumed to be irreversible.  
Table 5.23 Third phase preference ranking of states for China 
DM # Options Strategies 
China 
1 Continue the AIIB Y Y N Y Y N 
2 Launch the RCEP Y N Y Y N N 
US 3 Join the AIIB N N N Y Y N 
State 
Ranking 
China 4 2 3 6 5 1 
 
Table 5.24 Third phase preference ranking of states for the US 
DM # Options Strategies 
China 
1 Continue the AIIB N Y N Y Y Y 
2 Launch the RCEP N N Y Y N Y 
US 3 Join the AIIB N N N N Y Y 
State 
Ranking 
US 1 [2 3] 4 5 6 
 
5.5.2 Stability Analysis of the Third Phase  
The investigations with respect to Nash, SEQ, GMR, and SMR solution concepts are shown 
individually for China and the US in Tables 5.25 and 5.26 respectively.  The equilibrium 
states of the third phase forecasted by the stability analyses are illustrated in Table 5.27.  The 
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analyses reveal that States 4 and 6 are strong equilibrium states since both are Nash equilibria.  
Therefore, according to the model, the conflict may end up in one of these states. 
The conflict has yet to reach its resolution in real life.  However, considering the current 
situation, it may end up in State 4, where China continues with the AIIB and launches the 
RCEP while the US does nothing.  One more thing to note is that State 4 is the only strong 
equilibrium if the move to join the AIIB is assumed as reversible. 
Table 5.25 Third phase individual stability analysis for China 
DM #  States (Ordered) 1 2 3 4 5 6 
China 
1 Continue the AIIB N Y N Y Y Y 
2 Launch the RCEP N N Y Y N Y 
US 3 Join the AIIB N N N N Y Y 
State 
Ranking 
 China 4 2 3 6 5 1 
 US 1 [2 3] 4 5 6 
Individual 
Stability 
 Nash - - - ✓ - ✓ 
 SEQ - - - ✓ - ✓ 
 GMR - ✓ ✓ ✓ - ✓ 
 SMR - ✓ ✓ ✓ - ✓ 
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Table 5.26 Third phase individual stability analysis for the US 
DM #  States (Ordered) 1 2 3 4 5 6 
China 
1 Continue the AIIB N Y N Y Y Y 
2 Launch the RCEP N N Y Y N Y 
US 3 Join the AIIB N N N N Y Y 
State 
Ranking 
 China 4 2 3 6 5 1 
 US 1 [2 3] 4 5 6 
Equilibria 
 Nash ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ 
 SEQ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ 
 GMR ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ 
 SMR ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ 
 
Table 5.27 Third phase stability analysis - Equilibria 
DM #  States (Ordered) 1 2 3 4 5 6 
China 
1 Continue the AIIB N Y N Y Y Y 
2 Launch the RCEP N N Y Y N Y 
US 3 Join the AIIB N N N N Y Y 
State 
Ranking 
 China 4 2 3 6 5 1 
 US 1 [2 3] 4 5 6 
Equilibria 
 Nash - - - ✓ - ✓ 
 SEQ - - - ✓ - ✓ 
 GMR - ✓ ✓ ✓ - ✓ 
 SMR - ✓ ✓ ✓ - ✓ 
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5.6 Options Effectiveness 
The proposed approach is applied on the GMCR model that was constructed to analyze the 
conflict between the US and China over global trade agreements (Alhindi et al., 2017a, b; 
2018b).  The conflict was divided into three phases and a GMCR model was established for 
each phase.  
5.6.1 First Phase Option Effectiveness 
The first phase of the conflict under study started when China proposed the initiative to 
launch the AIIB in 2013, an initiative that would strengthen China’s position in the world’s 
economic politics.  The US had two alternatives at the time, either to join the AIIB or oppose 
it and lobby its allies against being part of it.  As explained in Chapter 3, the Option 
Effectiveness approach is divided into two major steps.  The first step is to calculate the 
strength of the equilibrium states and the second step is to measure the option effectiveness.  
The stability analysis that was done using the GMCR model of the first phase will be the 
basis of measuring the Option Effectiveness for the first phase of the conflict.   
The strength of equilibria calculations can be carried out using Equation 3.1 for each of the 
equilibrium states, and will be used to compute the Option Effectiveness.  To start, one needs 
to ascertain the solution concept under which an equilibrium state is an equilibrium.  Strength 
points for a state are assigned based on the solution concepts under which the state is 
equilibrium.  For instance, if a state is in equilibrium under Nash stability then is it given 4 
points; 3 points for SEQ equilibrium; 2 points for SMR equilibrium; and 1 point for GMR 
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equilibrium, as indicated in Table 3.2.  For a given equilibrium state, all these points are 
accumulated using Equation 3.1.  Table 5.28 shows the tabular approach for calculating the 
strength of equilibrium states in the first phase of this conflict.  The middle four columns in 
the table under Nash, SEQ, SMR, and GMR solution concepts show the type of the 
equilibrium, where “1” is entered for the states that are equilibrium under that stability 
definition and “0” otherwise. The last column in Table 5.28 displays the strength of 
equilibrium states. The stability analysis of the first phase conflict model revealed two 
equilibrium states, which are Nash, SEQ, SMR, and GMR equilibria.  Hence, both states 
accumulated 10 strength points. 
Table 5.28  Strength of Equilibria calculation for the first phase GMCR model of the conflict 
between China and the US over global trade agreements 
Equilibrium 
Equilibrium representation using the 
solution concepts Strength of 
Equilibrium Nash 
(4) 
SEQ 
(3) 
SMR 
(2) 
GMR  
(1) 
𝐸1 = 𝑆3 1 1 1 1 10 
𝐸2 = 𝑆4 1 1 1 1 10 
 
The Option Effectiveness computation, Equation 3.2, can be carried out once the strengths 
of all equilibrium states have been identified.  For a given option, the Option Effectiveness 
is calculated by summing the strengths of all the equilibrium states in which the option is 
selected.  Table 5.29 explains the option selection occurrences and the effectiveness of each 
option in the conflict.  The option selection is presented by “1”, for selected, and “0” 
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otherwise, next to each equilibrium state row-wise, and under a given option column-wise.  
The last column in the table summarizes the strength of the equilibrium state extracted from 
Table 5.28, and the last row in Table 5.29 lists the Option Effectiveness value for each option 
in the conflict model.  
For instance, Option 1, denoted by 𝑶1, establishing the AIIB by China, is selected under 
both equilibrium states of the first phase.  Therefore, its option effectiveness is calculated by 
summing 𝑆𝑇𝑅(𝑆3) and 𝑆𝑇𝑅(𝑆4), as shown in the first column of Table 5.28, and can be 
mathematically expressed as: 
𝐸𝐹𝐹 (𝑂1) =   𝑎11 𝑆𝑇𝑅(𝑆3) + 𝑎21 𝑆𝑇𝑅(𝑆4) = (1) ∗ 10 + (1) ∗ 10 = 20 
The same approach is followed to calculate the effectiveness of the remaining options in 
the model.  As indicated in Table 5.29, Option 1 has an option effectiveness value of 20; 
Option 2, joining the AIIB by the US and Japan, has an option effectiveness value of 10; and 
Option 3, opposing the AIIB by the US, has a total option effectiveness value of 10.  Option 
1 can be considered as the main reason for the conflict, and it achieved the highest option 
effectiveness.  Meanwhile, Options 2 and 3 have a tie in their effectiveness, as both achieved 
the same value, meaning that either of these options is likely to be part of the final resolution, 
along with Option 1.  
Historically, in this phase of the dispute China was well on its way to establishing the AIIB.  
In the meantime, the US, along with Japan, was lobbying to keep its allies from joining the 
AIIB. 
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Table 5.29  Tabular approach for computing the Option Effectiveness for the first phase 
GMCR model of the conflict between China and the US over global trade agreements 
 𝑶𝟏 𝑶𝟐 𝑶𝟑 
Strength of 
Equilibrium 
𝑬𝟏 = 𝑺𝟑 1 1 0 10 
 𝑬𝟐 = 𝑺𝟒 1 0 1 10 
Option 
Effectiveness 
20 10 10  
5.6.2 Second Phase Option Effectiveness 
The conflict model of the second phase includes six options.  Two of these options are 
controlled by China and the remainder by the US.  The general option form of the conflict, 
including the available options and the preference ranking for each DM, is shown in Table 
5.12.  The stability analysis of the second phase model found seven equilibrium states, as 
shown in Table 5.13.  For calculating the Option Effectiveness of this GMCR model, the 
strength of each equilibrium state needs to be computed.  Therefore, the first step is to assign 
strength points to each equilibrium state, denoted by 𝑆𝑇𝑅(𝐸), as shown in Table 5.30, based 
on the criteria shown in Table 3.2, by applying Equation 3.1.  Table 5.30 lists the strengths 
of the equilibrium states in the last column.  The strong equilibrium states, States 12, 15, 17, 
and 18, have 10 strength points, since they are found to be Nash, SEQ, SMR, and GMR 
equilibria.  Meanwhile, States 1 and 5 are SEQ, SMR, and GMR equilibria and have 6 
strength points each.  State 14 is the weakest equilibrium in the conflict model and has only 
3 strength points. 
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Table 5.30  Strength of Equilibria calculation for the second phase standard GMCR model 
of the conflict between China and the US over global trade agreements (Alhindi et al., 2018c), 
© 2018 IEEE 
Equilibrium 
Equilibrium representation using the 
solution concepts Strength of 
Equilibrium Nash 
(4) 
SEQ 
(3) 
SMR 
(2) 
GMR  
(1) 
𝐸1 = 𝑆1 0 1 1 1 6 
𝐸2 =  𝑆5 0 1 1 1 6 
𝐸3 =  𝑆12 1 1 1 1 10 
𝐸4 =  𝑆14 0 0 1 1 3 
𝐸5 =  𝑆15 1 1 1 1 10 
𝐸6 =  𝑆17 1 1 1 1 10 
𝐸7 =  𝑆18 1 1 1 1 10 
Accordingly, the effectiveness of each option in the conflict model can be computed using 
Equation 3.2 by summing up the strength of the equilibrium states in which a given option is 
selected.  Table 5.31 illustrates the tabular approach for calculating the Option Effectiveness.  
Therefore, the effectiveness of Option 1, establishing the AIIB by China, is 
𝐸𝐹𝐹 (𝑂1) =  𝑎21 𝑆𝑇𝑅(𝑆5) +  𝑎31 𝑆𝑇𝑅(𝑆12) + 𝑎41 𝑆𝑇𝑅(𝑆14) + 𝑎51 𝑆𝑇𝑅(𝑆15) + 𝑎61 𝑆𝑇𝑅(𝑆17)
+ 𝑎71 𝑆𝑇𝑅(𝑆18) = (1) ∗ 6 + (1) ∗ 10 + (1) ∗ 3 + (1) ∗ 10 + (1) ∗ 10 + (1) ∗ 10
= 49 
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Table 5.31  Tabular approach for computing the Option Effectiveness for the second phase 
standard GMCR model of the conflict between China and the US over global trade 
agreements (Alhindi et al., 2018c), © 2018 IEEE 
 𝑶𝟏 𝑶𝟐 𝑶𝟑 𝑶𝟒 𝑶𝟓 𝑶𝟔 
Strength of 
Equilibrium 
𝑬𝟏  =  𝑺𝟏 0 0 0 0 0 0 6 
𝑬𝟐  =  𝑺𝟓 1 1 0 1 0 0 6 
𝑬𝟑 =  𝑺𝟏𝟐 1 0 1 0 0 1 10 
𝑬𝟒 =  𝑺𝟏𝟒 1 1 0 1 0 1 3 
𝑬𝟓 =  𝑺𝟏𝟓 1 0 1 1 0 1 10 
𝑬𝟔 =  𝑺𝟏𝟕 1 0 0 0 1 1 10 
𝑬𝟕 =  𝑺𝟏𝟖 1 0 0 1 1 1 10 
Option 
Effectiveness 
49 9 20 29 20 43  
The Option Effectiveness for the remaining options in the conflict can be similarly 
calculated.  Option 1 has the highest effectiveness, since it contributes to six of the seven 
equilibrium states.  An argument can be made that this option is essentially the reason for the 
conflict; the conflict probably would not exist if this option was removed.  Furthermore, 
Option 6, launching the TPP agreement by the US, has an effectiveness value of 43, which 
is the 2nd-highest among all the options, indicating that it is the most effective counter-move 
by the US.  Option 4, requesting China to accept the terms offered by the US, is ranked 3rd, 
with an effectiveness value of 29.  In the meantime, the 4th rank in terms of option 
effectiveness belongs to Option 3, the US to join the AIIB, and Option 5, the US to oppose 
the AIIB, indicating a tie.  Surprisingly, these two options had the same effectiveness ranking 
in the first phase as well.  The least effective action in the second phase is Option 2, China 
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accepting the US terms over the AIIB.  Option 2 being the least effective option makes sense, 
since it puts China under US influence by accepting the terms over the AIIB while also 
increasing their contribution to the World Bank, rather than having the freedom to do so of 
their own will.  Another thing to note is that this option is dependent on Option 5, meaning 
that it can only be selected if Option 5 is selected by the US.  
The hypergame analysis of the second phase of this conflict has shown that the TPP’s 
effects are misperceived by both DMs, China and the US, and therefore these resolutions are 
compromised and are only valid if the real information about the TPP is inaccessible for the 
DMs.  Hence, to accurately analyze the second phase of the conflict, the Option Effectiveness 
approach needs to be applied on the hypergame model of the second phase.  
The hypergame investigation, in which the option of launching the TPP by the US is 
removed, predicted five equilibrium states.  Table 5.17 shows the stability analysis of the 
hypergame model for the second phase of the conflict.  States 6, 8, and 9 were all found to 
be Nash, SEQ, SMR, and GMR equilibria, whereas States 1 and 5 are SEQ, SMR, and GMR 
equilibria.  Strength points can be assigned to each of the equilibrium states in the hypergame 
conflict model in the second phase based on the criteria mentioned in Table 3.2.  By applying 
Equation 3.1, States 6, 8, and 9 are assigned 10 strength points each, since they are in 
equilibrium under each of the Nash, SEQ, SMR, and GMR solution concepts.  Meanwhile, 
States 1 and 5 accumulate 6 strength points each, as they are SEQ, SMR, and GMR equilibria.  
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Table 5.32 shows the strength of equilibria calculations of the hypergame model and the 
associated strength points given to each equilibrium.  
Table 5.32  Strength of Equilibria calculation for the second phase hypergame GMCR 
model of the conflict between China and the US over global trade agreements (Alhindi et 
al., 2018c), © 2018 IEEE 
Equilibrium 
Equilibrium representation 
using the solution concepts Strength of 
Equilibrium Nash 
(4) 
SEQ 
(3) 
SMR 
(2) 
GMR  
(1) 
𝐸1 = 𝑆1 0 1 1 1 6 
𝐸2 =  𝑆5 0 1 1 1 6 
𝐸3 =  𝑆6 1 1 1 1 10 
𝐸4 =  𝑆8 1 1 1 1 10 
𝐸5 =  𝑆9 1 1 1 1 10 
The Option Effectiveness is calculated using Equation 3.2 for the hypergame model, and 
the tabular approach for calculating it for the hypergame is shown in Table 5.33.  Similar to 
the Option Effectiveness of the standard GMCR model of the second phase, Option 1, 
establishing the AIIB by China, has the highest effectiveness and is found to be the root of 
the dispute.  However, the 2nd-highest effectiveness is achieved by Option 4, the US offering 
China terms over the AIIB, which is selected in three of the five equilibrium states, and in 
fact, in real life, this option was the reason that the US withheld its opposition after the 
Chinese acceptance of the US terms over the AIIB.  By accepting these terms, China had to 
increase its contributions to the World Bank.  The 3rd-highest effectiveness is achieved by 
Option 5, opposing the AIIB, and it is controlled by the US, whereas the 4th-highest 
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effectiveness is reached by Option 3, the US joining the AIIB.  The ranking order of Option 
5 and Option 3 means that Option 5 is more effective than Option 3, which is why the US 
opposed the AIIB as mean to press China in accepting their terms over the AIIB rather than 
joining the AIIB itself.  
The counter-move, opposing the AIIB, exercised by the US was successful, and it lured 
China into accept the US terms, which may not have been the case if the US had joined the 
AIIB.  Similar to the option effectiveness of the standard GMCR model of the second phase, 
the least effective option in the hypergame model is Option 2, China accepting the US terms 
over the AIIB, since it only contributed to a single equilibrium state.  As mentioned earlier, 
Option 2 being the least effective option can rather be justified, as it allows the US to impose 
terms on China and force it to increase its contributions to the World Bank.  
Table 5.33  Tabular approach for computing the Option Effectiveness for the second phase 
hypergame GMCR model of the conflict between China and the US over global trade 
agreements (Alhindi et al., 2018c), © 2018 IEEE 
 𝑶𝟏 𝑶𝟐 𝑶𝟑 𝑶𝟒 𝑶𝟓 
Strength of 
Equilibrium 
𝑬𝟏  = 𝑺𝟏 0 0 0 0 0 6 
𝑬𝟐 =  𝑺𝟓 1 1 0 1 0 6 
𝑬𝟑 =  𝑺𝟔 1 0 1 1 0 10 
𝑬𝟒 =  𝑺𝟖 1 0 0 0 1 10 
𝑬𝟓 =  𝑺𝟗 1 0 0 1 1 10 
Option 
Effectiveness 
36 6 10 26 20  
 95 
5.6.3 Third Phase Option Effectiveness 
The third phase of the conflict has some options combined, another newly introduced, and 
some removed.  The options to establish the AIIB and to accept the US terms over the AIIB, 
both controlled by China, are combined into continuation of the AIIB, and which is controlled 
by China.  The new option, controlled by China, is to Launch the RCEP.  As for the US, all 
the options were eliminated from the conflict model besides the option to join the AIIB, as 
described previously, resulting in a conflict model with only three options in total.  
The stability analysis of the third phase, shown in Table 5.27, indicates that there are four 
equilibrium states, in which States 4 and 6 are Nash, SEQ, SMR, and GMR equilibrium and 
States 2 and 3 are SMR and GMR equilibrium only.  Therefore, by applying Equation 3.1, 
the strength of equilibrium States 4 and 6 is 10 strength points each, whereas equilibrium 
States 2 and 3 have 3 strength points each.  Table 5.34 illustrates the tabular approach for 
calculating strengths of equilibrium for the third phase of the conflict. 
Table 5.34  Strength of Equilibria calculation for the third phase GMCR model of the 
conflict between China and the US over global trade agreements 
Equilibrium 
Equilibrium representation 
using the solution concepts Strength of 
Equilibrium Nash 
(4) 
SEQ 
(3) 
SMR 
(2) 
GMR  
(1) 
𝐸1 = 𝑆2 0 0 1 1 3 
𝐸2 = 𝑆3 0 0 1 1 3 
𝐸3 = 𝑆4 1 1 1 1 10 
𝐸4 = 𝑆6 1 1 1 1 10 
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Subsequently, the option effectiveness for an option in the third phase of the conflict can 
be calculated by summing up the strength of the equilibrium states in which that option has 
been selected.  For example, the option effectiveness for Option 1, China to continue with 
the AIIB, can be calculated using Equation 3.2 and can be expressed mathematically as: 
𝐸𝐹𝐹 (𝑂1) =  𝑎11 𝑆𝑇𝑅(𝑆2) +  𝑎31 𝑆𝑇𝑅(𝑆4) + 𝑎41 𝑆𝑇𝑅(𝑆6) = (1) ∗ 3 + (1) ∗ 10 + (1) ∗ 10 = 23 
Accordingly, the effectiveness of the remaining option can be computed in a similar manner.  
Table 5.35 explains the tabular approach for calculating the effectiveness of the options 
involved in the third phase of the conflict.  Option 1, China to continue with the AIIB, and 
Option 2, launching the RCEP by China, are both ranked as the most effective options in the 
conflict, since both scored an effectiveness value of 23.  Meanwhile, Option 3, the US and 
Japan to join the AIIB, is ranked the least effective, only accumulating a value of 10.  
However, one can argue that the importance of unselecting the option could be included.  In 
fact, in this case, the action of unselecting Option 3 is deemed to be more effective than 
selecting it.  The strategies or equilibrium states in which Option 3 is unselecting are States 
2, 3, and 4, which have 3, 3, and 10 strength points respectively.  Therefore, the action of 
unselecting Option 3 will result in an effectiveness value of 16 when applying Equation 3.2, 
and consequently, the action of unselecting Option 3 is ranked higher than choosing Option 
3 for the US in terms of effectiveness.  
In the third phase of the conflict, China has continued its endeavor in running the AIIB 
and is seriously considering the launch of the RCEP trade agreement as well.  In the 
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meantime, the US has neglected the idea of participating in the AIIB.  The historic events of 
the conflict justify the ranking of the options involved with respect to Option Effectiveness, 
especially for the case of the US unselecting Option 3 in comparison to choosing it. 
Table 5.35 Tabular approach for computing the Option Effectiveness for the third phase 
GMCR model of the conflict between China and the US over global trade agreements 
 𝑶𝟏 𝑶𝟐 𝑶𝟑 
Strength of 
Equilibrium 
𝑬𝟏 = 𝑺𝟐 1 0 0 3 
𝑬𝟐 = 𝑺𝟑 0 1 0 3 
𝑬𝟑 = 𝑺𝟒 1 1 0 10 
𝑬𝟒 = 𝑺𝟔 1 1 1 10 
Option 
Effectiveness 
23 23 10  
5.7 Overall Strategic Insights 
The stability analysis of the first phase indicated that States 3 and State 4 are possible 
resolutions for that point in time.  Moreover, if the move to join the AIIB by the US and 
Japan is considered reversible, then State 4 is the only equilibrium for the first phase of the 
conflict.  In State 4, China establishes the AIIB and the US opposes it while lobbying its 
allies against joining it, which represents the exact resolution for that period in real life.  
The standard GMCR and hypergame investigation of the models for the second phase 
indicates that State 5 could be a resolution, where China forms the AIIB and acknowledges 
the US terms over the AIIB.  Moreover, State 5 is identical to the situation under the Obama 
Administration in the US, in which China established the AIIB and accepted the US terms 
regarding the AIIB.  Meanwhile, the US stopped their opposition towards the AIIB and did 
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not launch the TPP agreement.  The hypergame analysis shows that the Trump administration 
was right about withdrawing from the TPP.  The conflict reached a temporary resolution in 
State 4 in the Trump Administration era, where China has established the AIIB and is looking 
forward to launching the RCEP. 
The investigation reveals that China might become the leader in global trade and fill the 
gap caused by the US by its withdrawal from the TPP, given that the Trump administration 
does not consider an alternative for the TPP.  Moreover, the conflict between the US and 
China is a major conflict in the 21st century, and does not seem to be ending anytime soon.  
It can actually be considered a long-term conflict, since changes in governments and 
leadership within these countries will significantly affect the outcomes of the conflict 
(Matbouli et al., 2015).  
The models developed for the three different points in time indicate that it is possible for a 
DM to include an option for influencing other DMs’ preferences.  This results in a change of 
the states’ preference rankings for the DMs, which may ultimately cause the equilibrium to 
shift to another state.  These new equilibrium states may be desired resolutions for the DM 
that influenced the preferences.  In the current study, the US included the option of launching 
the TPP and offering to negotiate terms with China over the establishment of the AIIB in 
exchange for a truce over the AIIB in the second phase.  These new options caused a change 
in preferences for the DMs and shifted the equilibrium to other states which are more 
practical and desirable for the US.  However, in the third phase, China had a new option, that 
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of establishing the RCEP trade agreement, which changed the preferences for the DMs and 
caused a shift in the equilibrium, leading to desirable resolutions for the Chinese.  
 
Figure 5.3 Historical evolution of the conflict over the three phases 
 
Table 5.36 Evolution of the conflict over the three phases 
 
The novel approach of measuring option effectiveness has been applied to the three phases 
of the conflict between China and the US over global trade agreements.  It demonstrates the 
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capability of the approach in investigating the conflict model at the option level.  The ranking 
of the options with respect to their effectiveness could indicate the option causing the conflict, 
the best counter-moves, and the least important option(s).  Moreover, it permits the effective 
comparison of a single option in terms of choosing it or unselecting it, as demonstrated in the 
case of Option 3 in the third phase of the conflict.   
Figure 5.3 illustrates the evolution of the conflict, and Table 5.36 presents the evolution of 
the conflict, starting from the left and ending at the right end of the table, as well as the 
equilibrium changes affected by the addition and removal of options by the DMs over the 
course of the conflict.  The dark gray-colored cells in the table show that the colored options 
are excluded from the conflict in that phase.  The arrows in the table indicate a change in the 
status of the options.  The table reveals that the conflict starts when China establishes the 
AIIB and reaches State 2 of the first phase and then the US opposes the AIIB, a move that 
resolves the conflict at State 4 in the first phase.  The US then introduces the options of 
proposing terms to China over the AIIB and launching the TPP, which is referred to as the 
second phase of the conflict in the present study.  In this phase, the US requests China to 
accept terms over the AIIB in exchange for a truce and the withdrawal of US opposition over 
the AIIB, China agrees to the US terms, and the conflict reaches a resolution at State 5 in the 
second phase in both GMCR and the hypergame models.  In the third phase of the conflict, 
the options for establishing the AIIB and accepting the US terms are combined into a single 
option mentioned as continuing the AIIB for China, whereas launching the RCEP is a new 
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option introduced for China.  Meanwhile, the US is only left with the option to join the AIIB.  
The conflict reaches a temporary equilibrium in the third phase in State 4, where China 
continues with the AIIB and works toward launching the RCEP agreement while the US 
remains calm and does nothing to counter-move. 
5.8 Summary 
The GMCR methodology and the Option Effectiveness advancement has been demonstrated 
by applying it to the three phases in time of the trade dispute between China and the US. The 
first phase of the conflict started in 2013 when China announced the establishment of the 
AIIB, and the US has countered it by lobbying its allies against joining it. The stability 
analysis predicted two equilibria at this phase. The Option Effectiveness has indicated that 
the option to establish the AIIB is the main reason behind this conflict. At the second stage 
of the conflict, which starts when the US proposed its terms to China over the AIIB, several 
equilibrium states were recognized as well as the resolution that occurred in real-world was 
identified. The Option Effectiveness procedure revealed that the establishing the AIIB still 
was the primary cause of the dispute and launching the TPP by the US was the best counter-
move. However, the application of the Option Effectiveness to the hypergame model, which 
removes the TPP option from the conflict model, showed that offering US terms to China 
over the AIIB would be the best move by the US. Four equilibria were revealed at the third 
stage of the conflict, which starts after Mr. Donald Trump’s inauguration as the President of 
the US. In this phase, he withdrew the US from the TPP trade agreement, and China was 
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working on launching the RCEP trade agreement. The Option Effectiveness approach 
confirms that the US act of not participating in the AIIB has a higher impact in resolving the 
conflict rather than joining it. The procedure has also revealed that launching the RCEP and 
continuing with the AIIB are two significant steps for the Chinese to resolve this trade 
conflict in their favor. China appears to be well on its way to overshadow US economic 
supremacy if the US does not fill the economic leadership void caused by its withdrawal from 
the TPP.  
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Chapter 6 
Option Effectiveness: Case Studies 
The Option Effectiveness approach is demonstrated further by applying it to the models of 
real-world conflicts such as the Elmira Conflict (Hipel, Kilgour, Fang, & Peng, 1999), the 
Cuban Missile Crisis (Fraser & Hipel, 1982, 1984; Hipel, 2011), and the Garrison Diversion 
Unit conflict (Fraser & Hipel, 1984).   These applications will allow a concrete evaluation of 
the Option Effectiveness method and its practicality in investigating real-world conflict 
models at the option level.  
6.1 Elmira Groundwater Contamination Conflict 
The Elmira groundwater contamination conflict started in late 1989 in the town of Elmira, 
located in southwestern Ontario, Canada.  The town, which lies in an agricultural region, is 
close to three of the Great Lakes and relies on an underground aquifer for its municipal water 
supply.  The aquifer was found to be contaminated by a carcinogen, N-nitroso dimethylamine 
(NDMA), in an investigation carried out by the Ontario Ministry of Environment (MoE) in 
late 1989.  Uniroyal Chemical Ltd. (Uniroyal) had a production plant for pesticides and 
rubber products in the area, which was considered as the likely source of the contaminating 
agent in the aquifer.  Moreover, Uniroyal had previous environmental issues and was 
associated with processes for producing NDMA (Hipel et al., 1999).  
A control order was issued by the MoE under the Environment Protection Act of Ontario 
that required Uniroyal to correct the problem by carrying out studies to evaluate the necessity 
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for a cleanup, conducting any required cleanup under the supervision of MoE, and 
implementing a long-term system that guaranteed the safe collection and treatment of waste.  
An appeal was filed immediately by Uniroyal against the MoE.  Moreover, the Regional 
Municipality of Waterloo and the Township of Woolwich (local governments) had a 
significant role in the dispute and took a common stance in the conflict, in which they 
recruited consultants and acquired legal advice about the situation at a considerable price 
(Hipel et al., 1999). 
Negotiations among the participating DMs in the dispute started in mid-1991.  The 
participants were, as described earlier, MoE, Uniroyal, and the local governments.  Every 
DM had a goal that they wanted to achieve.  For instance, the MoE’s goal was to continue 
carrying out its order; Uniroyal was seeking to alter or overturn the order; and the local 
governments’ objective was to safeguard their inhabitants and the industrial sector (Hipel et 
al., 1999). 
6.1.1 The Conflict Model 
This conflict model constitutes three DMs, MoE, Uniroyal, and local governments, with 
each having its own objective in the conflict, as explained earlier.  Certain options were 
considered for each DM.  For instance, the MoE had the option to modify its mandate; 
Uniroyal’s options constituted of delaying the process, accepting the mandate, or abandoning 
the plant; and the local governments had only one option, which was to insist on carrying out 
the mandate put forward by the MoE.  Table 6.1 shows the option form of the conflict where 
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all the options are listed next to the DM that controlled it.  The preference ranking of the 
states for MoE, Uniroyal, and local governments are shown in Tables 6.2, 6.3, and 6.4 
respectively.  These preference rankings were obtained directly from the study published by 
Hipel et al. in 1999. 
Table 6.1 Option form of the Elmira Groundwater water contamination conflict 
DM # 
States 
(Ordered) 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
MoE 1 Modify N Y N Y N Y N Y - 
Uniroyal 
2 Delay Y Y N N Y Y N N N 
3 Accept N N Y Y N N Y Y N 
4 Abandon N N N N N N N N Y 
Local 
Governments 
5 Insist N N N N Y Y Y Y - 
 
Table 6.2 Preference ranking of MoE in the Elmira groundwater water contamination 
conflict 
DM # Options Strategies 
MoE 1 Modify N N Y Y N N Y Y - 
Uniroyal 
2 Delay N N N N Y Y Y Y N 
3 Accept Y Y Y Y N N N N N 
4 Abandon N N N N N N N N Y 
Local 
Governments 
5 Insist Y N N Y Y N N Y - 
Preference (Ordered) 7 3 4 8 5 1 2 6 9 
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Table 6.3 Preference ranking of Uniroyal in the Elmira groundwater water contamination 
conflict 
DM # Options Strategies 
MoE 1 Modify N Y Y N - N N Y Y 
Uniroyal 
2 Delay Y N N Y N N N Y Y 
3 Accept N Y Y N N Y Y N N 
4 Abandon N N N N Y N N N N 
Local 
Governments 
5 Insist N N Y Y - N Y N Y 
Preference (Ordered) 1 4 8 5 9 3 7 2 6 
 
Table 6.4 Preference ranking of Local Governments in the Elmira groundwater water 
contamination conflict 
DM # Options Strategies 
MoE 1 Modify N N N N Y Y Y Y - 
Uniroyal 
2 Delay N N Y Y N Y N Y N 
3 Accept Y Y N N Y N Y N N 
4 Abandon N N N N N N N N Y 
Local 
Governments 
5 Insist Y N Y N Y Y N N - 
Preference (Ordered) 7 3 5 1 8 6 4 2 9 
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6.1.2 Stability Analysis 
The individual stability analysis of the conflict model was carried out using GMCR+ 
(Kinsara et al., 2015b).  The results are identical to what was obtained by the study conducted 
by Hipel et al. in 1999.  Tables 6.5, 6.6, and 6.7 show the individual stability analysis results 
for the MoE, Uniroyal, and local governments respectively.  These results are used to 
determine the equilibrium states of the conflict model, as shown in Table 6.8.  
Table 6.5 Individual stability analysis of the Elmira groundwater water contamination 
conflict with respect to MoE 
DM # 
States 
(Ordered) 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
MoE 1 Modify N Y N Y N Y N Y - 
Uniroyal 
2 Delay Y Y N N Y Y N N N 
3 Accept N N Y Y N N Y Y N 
4 Abandon N N N N N N N N Y 
Local 
Governments 
5 Insist N N N N Y Y Y Y - 
Solution concepts 
Nash ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ 
SEQ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ 
SMR ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ 
GMR ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ 
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Table 6.6 Individual stability analysis of the Elmira groundwater water contamination 
conflict with respect to Uniroyal 
DM # 
States 
(Ordered) 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
MoE 1 Modify N Y N Y N Y N Y - 
Uniroyal 
2 Delay Y Y N N Y Y N N N 
3 Accept N N Y Y N N Y Y N 
4 Abandon N N N N N N N N Y 
Local 
Governments 
5 Insist N N N N Y Y Y Y - 
Solution concepts 
Nash ✓ - - ✓ ✓ - - ✓ ✓ 
SEQ ✓ - - ✓ ✓ - - ✓ ✓ 
SMR ✓ - - ✓ ✓ - - ✓ ✓ 
GMR ✓ - - ✓ ✓ - - ✓ ✓ 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 109 
 
 
 
 
Table 6.7 Individual stability analysis of the Elmira groundwater water contamination 
conflict with respect to Local Governments 
DM # 
States 
(Ordered) 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
MoE 1 Modify N Y N Y N Y N Y - 
Uniroyal 
2 Delay Y Y N N Y Y N N N 
3 Accept N N Y Y N N Y Y N 
4 Abandon N N N N N N N N Y 
Local 
Governments 
5 Insist N N N N Y Y Y Y - 
Solution concepts 
Nash - - - - ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ 
SEQ - ✓ ✓ - ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ 
SMR ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ 
GMR ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ 
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Table 6.8 Stability analysis of the Elmira groundwater water contamination conflict showing 
the equilibrium states 
DM # 
States 
(Ordered) 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
MoE 1 Modify N Y N Y N Y N Y - 
Uniroyal 
2 Delay Y Y N N Y Y N N N 
3 Accept N N Y Y N N Y Y N 
4 Abandon N N N N N N N N Y 
Local 
Governments 
5 Insist N N N N Y Y Y Y - 
Solution concepts 
Nash - - - - ✓ - - ✓ ✓ 
SEQ - - - - ✓ - - ✓ ✓ 
SMR ✓ - - ✓ ✓ - - ✓ ✓ 
GMR ✓ - - ✓ ✓ - - ✓ ✓ 
6.1.3 Strength of Equilibria 
Stability analysis is a key component of the Option Effectiveness methodology, as mentioned 
in Chapter 3.  The results obtained by the stability analysis of the conflict model are used as 
a basis to calculate the strength of the equilibria and the option effectiveness.  Equation 3.1 
is applied to calculate the strength of each equilibrium state, and Table 6.9 shows the strength 
of the equilibrium states in the last column to the right.  The type of an equilibrium state is 
shown under Nash, SEQ, SMR, and GMR solution concepts columns in Table 6.9, where 
“1” indicates that the state is equilibrium under the solution concept and “0” indicates that its 
not an equilibrium with regards to that stability definition. States 1 and 4 have a strength 
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value of 3 due to only being equilibrium states under SMR and GMR stability concepts, while 
States 5, 8, and 9 have a strength value of 10 since they are Nash, SEQ, SMR, GMR 
equilibria.  
Table 6.9 Strength of Equilibria calculation of the Elmira groundwater water contamination 
conflict model 
Equilibrium 
Equilibrium representation 
using the solution concepts Strength of 
Equilibrium Nash 
(4) 
SEQ 
(3) 
SMR 
(2) 
GMR  
(1) 
𝐸1 = 𝑆1 0 0 1 1 3 
𝐸2 = 𝑆4 0 0 1 1 3 
𝐸3 = 𝑆5 1 1 1 1 10 
𝐸4 = 𝑆8 1 1 1 1 10 
𝐸5 = 𝑆9 1 1 1 1 10 
6.1.4 Option Effectiveness 
Option effectiveness can only be calculated after the computation of the equilibria strengths.  
Therefore, the results shown in Table 6.9 are used for measuring the option effectiveness for 
each option in the conflict using Equation 3.2.  Option 1 and Option 5 in State 9 can either 
be selected or unselected, and therefore they are given a constant value of 0.5 which is to be 
multiplied by the strength of State 9.  Table 6.10 summarized the Option Effectiveness 
calculations for all the options in the model.  The option selection is presented by “1”, for 
chosen, and “0”, for unselected, next to each equilibrium state row-wise, and under a given 
option, column-wise.  The last column in the table lists the strength of the equilibrium state 
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extracted from Table 6.9, and the last row in Table 6.10 shows the option effectiveness each 
option in the conflict model. 
The highest importance based on Equation 3.2 is achieved by Option 5, which is the option 
to insist on the mandate by the Local Governments; Option 1, modify the order, controlled 
by MoE, is ranked 2nd in terms of importance.  A tie for the 3rd rank has occurred for Option 
2, delay the process, and Option 3, accept the mandate, which are controlled by Uniroyal.  
Option 4, Uniroyal abandoning the plant, is considered the least important based on option 
effectiveness.  
Table 6.10 Option Effectiveness calculation of the Elmira groundwater water contamination 
conflict model 
 𝑶𝟏 𝑶𝟐 𝑶𝟑 𝑶𝟒 𝑶𝟓 
Strength of 
Equilibrium 
𝑬𝟏 = 𝑺𝟏 0 1 0 0 0 3 
𝑬𝟐 = 𝑺𝟒 1 0 1 0 0 3 
𝑬𝟑 = 𝑺𝟓 0 1 0 0 1 10 
𝑬𝟒 = 𝑺𝟖 1 0 1 0 1 10 
𝑬𝟓 = 𝑺𝟗 
- 
(0.5) 
0 0 1 
- 
(0.5) 10 
Option 
Effectiveness 
18 13 13 10 25  
For an extended period of time State 5 was the resolution of the conflict at which Option 2 
and Option 5 are selected by the relevant DMs.  However, due to a coalition between the 
MoE and Uniroyal, the resolution shifted to State 8, where Options 1, 3, and 5 are selected.  
It can be noticed that Option 5, which is to insist on the mandate by the local governments, 
 113 
has the highest importance ranking, is selected in both equilibrium states.  Meanwhile, Option 
4 is not chosen in any of the real-world resolutions.  Thus, Option 5 having the highest 
importance and Option 4 having the lowest effectiveness in the dispute is justified.  
6.2 The Cuban Missile Crisis 
The United States (US) had complete control over Cuba politically and economically prior 
to 1957.  The control was achieved by influencing the government of Fulgencio Batista.  
Cuba was also a hub for many American agricultural and tourism companies.  However, in 
late 1956 an uprising by Fidel Castro began in order to remove Batista’s regime and 
overthrow his government.  Castro was successful in seizing control of Cuba in 1959.  During 
this time, the Cuban government leaned towards an alliance with the Soviet Union (USSR); 
all American property was nationalized and many American economic investments were lost, 
making Cuba a hot issue in the US (Fraser & Hipel, 1982, 1984; Hipel, 2011). 
In April 1961, Cuban exiles began the Bay of Pigs invasion with the backing of the US.  
However, the invasion failed as US President Kennedy withdrew support after the USSR 
threatened to support Cuba in defending itself, including supplying missiles to the Cuban 
military, even if it meant a nuclear war between the US and USSR.  Later, on October 14th, 
1962, the US found concrete evidence of USSR missiles located in Cuba.  Consequently, 
President Kennedy ordered the establishment of the Executive Committee of the National 
Security Council.  According to Fraser and Hipel (1982, 1984), the committee was tasked 
with formulating possible actions, which included:  
 114 
• Aggressive options are not to be performed, which would result in an increased USSR 
missile power, the American early warning systems to be outmaneuvered, and 
damage credibility in American foreign promises. All these concerns could be 
mitigated by using the United Nations or the Organization of American States, or by 
a summit meeting with Khrushchev as a means for diplomatic pressure on the USSR 
to withdraw its missiles from Cuba and avoid an escalation to an all-out nuclear war. 
• Conduct an air strike, which would destroy the bases that hold the missiles. This 
action will quite possible require an inland invasion as a follow-up. 
• Enforce a blockade by the American navy which would cut off all military supplies 
to Cuba. 
(Fraser & Hipel, 1982, 1984) 
Meanwhile, the USSR had three possible options in the dispute: 
• Keep the missiles in Cuba 
• Withdraw the missiles from Cuba 
• Escalate the dispute by considering one of the following actions: 
o Attack the US navy ships 
o Launch missiles on American inland targets from Cuba 
o Launch an Inter-Continental Ballistic Missile attack on the US. 
o Attack West Berlin 
 (Fraser & Hipel, 1982, 1984; Hipel, 2011) 
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Historically, the US imposed a strategic military blockade on Cuba, and the USSR 
withdrew its missiles from Cuba (Fraser & Hipel, 1982, 1984). 
6.2.1 The Conflict Model 
Essentially all the key inputs were the same, as shown in the study published by Fraser and 
Hipel in 1982.  The point in time considered for the conflict is October 17th, 1962.  The 
relevant DMs in the conflict were the US and USSR, and Cuba was neglected since it had no 
independent action available at this time.  Table 6.11 shows the option form of the Cuban 
Missile Crisis conflict.  The preference ranking for the DMs was obtained from the same 
1982 study published by Fraser and Hipel, which are explained in Tables 6.12, and 6.13 for 
the US and USSR respectively. 
Table 6.11 Option form of the Cuban missile crisis conflict 
DM # Ordered 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 
US 
1 Air Strike N Y N Y N Y N Y N Y N Y 
2 Blockade N N Y Y N N Y Y N N Y Y 
USSR 
3 Withdraw N N N N Y Y Y Y N N N N 
4 Escalate N N N N N N N N Y Y Y Y 
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Table 6.12 Preference ranking of the US in the Cuban missile crisis conflict 
DM # Options Strategies 
US 
1 Air Strike N N Y Y N Y Y N Y Y N N 
2 Blockade N Y N Y Y N Y N Y N Y N 
USSR 
3 Withdraw Y Y Y Y N N N N N N N N 
4 Escalate N N N N N N N N Y Y Y Y 
Preference (Ordered) 5 7 6 8 3 2 4 1 12 10 11 9 
 
 
Table 6.13 Preference ranking of the USSR in the Cuban missile crisis conflict 
DM # Options Strategies 
US 
1 Air Strike N N N N Y Y Y Y Y Y N N 
2 Blockade N N Y Y N N Y Y Y N Y N 
USSR 
3 Withdraw N Y Y N Y N Y N N N N N 
4 Escalate N N N N N N N N Y Y Y Y 
Preference (Ordered) 1 5 7 3 6 2 8 4 12 10 11 9 
6.2.2 Stability Analysis 
Similar to the stability analysis of the previous conflicts shown in this study, GMCR+ 
(Kinsara et al., 2015b) was used to carry out the stability analysis of the conflict model.  The 
individual stabilities are shown in Table 6.14 for the US, whereas Table 6.15 shows the 
individual stability of the USSR.  
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Table 6.14 Individual stability analysis of the Cuban missile crisis conflict with respect to 
the US 
DM # Ordered 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 
US 
1 Air Strike N Y N Y N Y N Y N Y N Y 
2 Blockade N N Y Y N N Y Y N N Y Y 
USSR 
3 Withdraw N N N N Y Y Y Y N N N N 
4 Escalate N N N N N N N N Y Y Y Y 
Solution 
concepts 
Nash - - ✓ - ✓ - - - - - - ✓ 
SEQ - - ✓ - ✓ - ✓ - - - - ✓ 
SMR ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ - - - ✓ 
GMR ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ - - - ✓ 
 
Table 6.15 Individual stability analysis of the Cuban missile crisis Conflict with respect to 
the USSR 
DM # Ordered 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 
US 
1 Air Strike N Y N Y N Y N Y N Y N Y 
2 Blockade N N Y Y N N Y Y N N Y Y 
USSR 
3 Withdraw N N N N Y Y Y Y N N N N 
4 Escalate N N N N N N N N Y Y Y Y 
Solution 
concepts 
Nash ✓ - - - - ✓ ✓ ✓ - - - - 
SEQ ✓ - - - ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ - - - - 
SMR ✓ ✓ ✓ - ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ - - - - 
GMR ✓ ✓ ✓ - ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ - - - - 
 
The equilibrium states are shown in Table 6.16, wherein States 5 and 7 are considered 
strong equilibrium states because the states are equilibria under SEQ stability. However, 
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States 1, 2, 3, 6, and 8 are all weak equilibria since they are considered as equilibria under 
SMR and GMR only.  Historically, State 7 was the actual resolution in this dispute, where 
the US chose to impose a blockade on all military shipments to Cuba, and, in return, the 
USSR withdrew its missiles from Cuba. 
Table 6.16 Stability analysis of the Cuban missile crisis conflict showing the equilibrium 
states 
DM # Ordered 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 
US 
1 Air Strike N Y N Y N Y N Y N Y N Y 
2 Blockade N N Y Y N N Y Y N N Y Y 
USSR 
3 Withdraw N N N N Y Y Y Y N N N N 
4 Escalate N N N N N N N N Y Y Y Y 
Solution 
concepts 
Nash - - - - - - - - - - - - 
SEQ - - - - ✓ - ✓ - - - - - 
SMR ✓ ✓ ✓ - ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ - - - - 
GMR ✓ ✓ ✓ - ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ - - - - 
 
6.2.3 Strength of Equilibria 
With the equilibrium states in the conflict model identified, one can calculate the strength of 
each equilibrium state using Equation 3.1.  As mentioned earlier, States 1, 2, 3, 6, and 8 are 
equilibria under SMR and GMR only, meaning that each of these states accumulates 3 
strength points.  Meanwhile, States 5 and 7 are both SEQ, SMR, and GMR equilibria and 
thus accumulate 6 points each.  The strength of equilibria computation is shown in Table 
6.17.  As previously explained, States 5 and 7 are strong equilibria and hence both have the 
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highest strength, whereas States 1, 2, 3, 6, and 8 have lower strength since they are considered 
weak equilibria. 
Table 6.17 Strength of Equilibria calculation of the Cuban missile crisis conflict model 
Equilibrium 
Equilibrium representation 
using the solution concepts Strength of 
Equilibrium Nash 
(4) 
SEQ 
(3) 
SMR 
(2) 
GMR  
(1) 
𝐸1 = 𝑆1 0 0 1 1 3 
𝐸2 = 𝑆2 0 0 1 1 3 
𝐸3 = 𝑆3 0 0 1 1 3 
𝐸4 = 𝑆5 0 1 1 1 6 
𝐸5 = 𝑆6 0 0 1 1 3 
𝐸6 = 𝑆7 0 1 1 1 6 
𝐸7 = 𝑆8 0 0 1 1 3 
 
6.2.4 Option Effectiveness 
One can calculate the Option Effectiveness for all the options available in the conflict model 
once the strength of each equilibrium state has been computed Equation 3.2. The strength of 
the equilibria values shown in Table 6.17 are considered to calculate the Option Effectiveness 
of the Cuban Missile Crisis conflict model.  Table 6.18 explains the option selection 
occurrences and the effectiveness of each option in the conflict.    
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Table 6.18 Option Effectiveness calculation of the Cuban Missile Crisis conflict model 
 𝑶𝟏 𝑶𝟐 𝑶𝟑 𝑶𝟒 
Strength of 
Equilibrium 
𝑬𝟏 = 𝑺𝟏 0 0 0 0 3 
𝑬𝟐 = 𝑺𝟐 1 0 0 0 3 
𝑬𝟑 = 𝑺𝟑 0 1 0 0 3 
𝑬𝟒 = 𝑺𝟓 0 0 1 0 6 
𝑬𝟓 = 𝑺𝟔 1 0 1 0 3 
𝑬𝟔 = 𝑺𝟕 0 1 1 0 6 
𝑬𝟕 = 𝑺𝟖 1 1 1 0 3 
Option 
Effectiveness 
9 12 18 0  
One can rank the options in terms of their importance based on the option effectiveness 
values achieved by each of the options (from most important to least important), starting with 
the option that has highest value of option effectiveness towards the option that has the lowest 
value.  In case of the Cuban Missile Crisis conflict, Option 3, withdrawal of the missiles form 
Cuba by the USSR, is the option that achieved the highest option effectiveness value of 18, 
and can be considered the most important option.  Option 3 is selected in four of the seven 
equilibrium states, and two of these states have strong equilibria.  Also, Option 3 is the main 
objective of the US and secretly of the USSR as well, in order to avoid an all-out nuclear 
war.  Option 3 was also part of the real-world resolution of the conflict, thus making it the 
most important option in the model and justifying its position as the option with the highest 
option effectiveness value in the conflict.  Furthermore, Option 2, the enforcement of a 
blockade by the US, is ranked 2nd with respect to option importance and effectiveness, since 
it accumulated an option effectiveness value of 12.  Is it considered that Option 3 is not 
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available without the selection of Option 2.  The 3rd-ranked option is Option 1, launching an 
airstrike by the US, since it achieved a value of 9.  Moreover, Option 4, escalation towards a 
nuclear war by the USSR, is ranked the lowest as it is not a part of any of the equilibrium 
states, as shown in Table 6.18.  In fact, scenarios involving Option 4 are least preferred by 
both DMs, which justifies Option 4 having the least effectiveness value in the conflict model.  
The most effective option is withdrawal by the USSR, and next to it is the blockade option 
by the US. 
6.3 The Garrison Diversion Unit  
The Option Effectiveness approach has shown its capabilities in analyzing conflict models at 
the option level by its application in the previous mentioned case studies.  However, applying 
the Option Effectiveness approach to a more complex conflict will strengthen the 
understanding of it and show its capabilities in investigating conflicts at the option level.  
Therefore, the Garrison Diversion Unit (GDU) dispute, which is considered a very complex 
conflict model (Fraser & Hipel, 1984), is used to demonstrate the Option Effectiveness 
procedure on a complex conflict model.   
The GDU is a multipurpose water resource project which involves transferring water from 
the Missouri River to regions in central and eastern North Dakota located in the Hudson Bay 
drainage basin.  Irrigation is one of the major benefits of water for the Americans, while some 
of the other benefits are the provision of municipal and industrial water supplies, increased 
employment, and wildlife and recreational areas (Fraser & Hipel, 1984). 
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The GDU dispute arose when the Canadians feared that substantial environmental harm 
and danger may result from the GDU project due to polluted irrigation water flowing into 
Canada through the Souris and Red Rivers.  Also, concerns of American environmentalists 
that the environmental damage in the US had been underestimated were another cause of the 
conflict.  International Joint Commission (IJC), an entity that deals with political disputes 
between the US and Canada which are related to water boundaries (Fraser & Hipel, 1984).  
6.3.1 The Conflict Model 
The point in time considered for the conflict model is April 1976 (Hipel & Fraser, 1980), and 
the parties with interests in the conflict involve: 
• United States Support for Garrison (US Support): a group of entities that expressed 
support for the GDU project, which include: the Bureau of Reclamation of the US 
Department of the Interior, which gave the greatest support; the Oversight 
Management Group within the US Department of the Interior; The Garrison 
Diversion Conservancy District, which is a highly-funded politically strong 
organization;  the State of North Dakota; the Garrison Diversion Irrigation Council; 
the National Park Service; and the North Dakota State Game and Fish Department 
(Fraser & Hipel, 1984). 
• United States Opposition to Garrison (US Opposition): consisting mainly of 
environmental activists and organizations. The participating environmental 
organizations are the National Audubon Society, the Environmental Protection 
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Agency, the Bureau of Sports Fisheries and Wildlife, and the President’s Council on 
Environmental Quality (Fraser & Hipel, 1984). 
• Canadian Opposition to Garrison (Canadian Opposition): many Canadian 
organization have expressed their opposition to the GDU project, and include the 
Canadian Federal Government, the Manitoba Provincial Government, Environment 
Canada, the Manitoba Environmental Council, the Prairie Environmental Defense 
League, the Manitoba Wildlife Federation, the Manitoba Ministry of Mines, 
Resources, and Environmental Management, and other industries, municipalities, and 
activists (Fraser & Hipel, 1984).  
• International Joint Commission: the commission was established within Article VI of 
the “treaty Between the United States and Great Britain Relating to Boundary Waters 
and Questions Arising Between the United States and Canada” in 1909 (Fraser & 
Hipel, 1984). 
The conflict model considers several possible options for the DMs involved; these options 
are summarized in Table 6.19, which is based on a table from (Fraser & Hipel, 1984).  The 
conflict model has a possible 512 states of which 489 are deemed to be infeasible based on 
the elimination criteria mentioned in the book.  The general option form including 23 feasible 
states is shown in Table 6.20.  The preference rankings for each DM are listed in Table 6.21, 
from “most preferred” on the left to “least preferred” on the right.  
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Table 6.19 The possible options available for the decision makers in the Garrison Diversion 
Unit conflict (Fraser & Hipel, 1984) 
DMs # Options 
US Support 
1 Continue with the completion of the full GDU project 
2 
Modify the GDU project to reduce Canadian environmental 
impacts 
3 Modify the GDU project to please American environmentalists 
US Opposition 4 Pursue legal action based on environmental legislation 
Canadian Opposition 5 Pursue legal action based on the Boundary Treaty of 1909 
IJC 
6 Back the accomplishment of the full GDU project 
7 
Back the accomplishment of a modified GDU to reduce 
Canadian environmental impacts 
8 
Back the cancellation of the GDU project with an exception for 
the Lonetree Reservoir project 
9 Back the complete cancellation of the GDU project 
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Table 6.20 Option form of the Garrison Diversion Unit conflict 
DM # 
States 
(Ordered) 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 
States 
(Decimal) 
34 36 41 42 50 52 57 58 66 68 74 82 84 89 90 146 148 153 154 274 276 281 282 
US Support 
1 Full N N Y N N N Y N N N N N N Y N N N Y N N N Y N 
2 Reduced Y N N Y Y N N Y Y N Y Y N N Y Y N N Y Y N N Y 
3 Appease N Y N N N Y N N N Y N N Y N N N Y N N N Y N N 
US 
Opposition 
4 Legal N N Y Y N N Y Y N N Y N N Y Y N N Y Y N N Y Y 
Canadian 
Opposition 
5 Treaty N N N N Y Y Y Y N N N Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 
IJC 
6 Full Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N 
7 Reduced N N N N N N N N Y Y Y Y Y Y Y N N N N N N N N 
8 Lonetree N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N Y Y Y Y N N N N 
9 Suspended N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N Y Y Y Y 
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Table 6.21 Preference ranking of US Support, US Opposition, Canadian Opposition, and IJC in the Garrison Diversion Unit 
conflict 
 
Preference Ranking 
(States are ranked from most preferred to the left to least preferred to the right) 
US 
Support 
3 7 [1 2] 4 [5 6] 8 9 12 11 15 10 13 14 17 16 18 19 21 20 22 23 
US 
Opposition 
[2 6 10 13 17 21] [19 23] 15 11 8 4 22 18 14 7 3 20 16 12 9 5 1 
Canadian 
Opposition 
23 [20 21] 19 [16 17] 11 [9 10] 15 [12 13] 2 4 1 8 [5 6] 22 18 14 3 7 
IJC [1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23] 
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6.3.2 Stability Analysis 
The stability analysis of the GDU conflict model was done using GMCR+ (Kinsara et al., 
2015b).  Tables 6.22, 6.23, 6.24, and 6.25 show the results of the individual stability analyses 
for US Support, US Opposition, Canadian Opposition, and IJC respectively.  The states found 
to be stable under a given solution concept, such as Nash, SEQ, SMR, and GMR, for all the 
DMs are considered equilibria under those solution concepts.  Table 6.26 shows the 
equilibrium states in the conflict model for all the solution concepts.  The investigation 
revealed that States 2, 3, 11, 17, 18, 21, and 22 are strong equilibrium states, since each of 
these states is an equilibrium under the Nash solution concept; hence, they are also considered 
as equilibria under the remaining solution concepts.  Moreover, States 8, 13, 14, 15, and 19 
are weak equilibria, since they are only found as equilibrium states under the SMR and GMR 
solution concepts.
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Table 6.22 Individual stability analysis of the Garrison Diversion Unit conflict with respect to US Support 
DM # 
States 
(Ordered) 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 
US Support 
1 Full N N Y N N N Y N N N N N N Y N N N Y N N N Y N 
2 Reduced Y N N Y Y N N Y Y N Y Y N N Y Y N N Y Y N N Y 
3 Appease N Y N N N Y N N N Y N N Y N N N Y N N N Y N N 
US 
Opposition 
4 Legal N N Y Y N N Y Y N N Y N N Y Y N N Y Y N N Y Y 
Canadian 
Opposition 
5 Treaty N N N N Y Y Y Y N N N Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 
IJC 
6 Full Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N 
7 Reduced N N N N N N N N Y Y Y Y Y Y Y N N N N N N N N 
8 Lonetree N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N Y Y Y Y N N N N 
9 Suspended N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N Y Y Y Y 
Solution 
concepts 
Nash ✓ ✓ ✓ - ✓ ✓ ✓ - ✓ - ✓ ✓ - - ✓ - ✓ ✓ - - ✓ ✓ - 
SEQ ✓ ✓ ✓ - ✓ ✓ ✓ - ✓ - ✓ ✓ - - ✓ - ✓ ✓ - - ✓ ✓ - 
SMR ✓ ✓ ✓ - ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ - ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ - ✓ ✓ - 
GMR ✓ ✓ ✓ - ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ - ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ - ✓ ✓ - 
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Table 6.23 Individual stability analysis of the Garrison Diversion Unit conflict with respect to US Opposition 
DM # 
States 
(Ordered) 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 
US Support 
1 Full N N Y N N N Y N N N N N N Y N N N Y N N N Y N 
2 Reduced Y N N Y Y N N Y Y N Y Y N N Y Y N N Y Y N N Y 
3 Appease N Y N N N Y N N N Y N N Y N N N Y N N N Y N N 
US 
Opposition 
4 Legal N N Y Y N N Y Y N N Y N N Y Y N N Y Y N N Y Y 
Canadian 
Opposition 
5 Treaty N N N N Y Y Y Y N N N Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 
IJC 
6 Full Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N 
7 Reduced N N N N N N N N Y Y Y Y Y Y Y N N N N N N N N 
8 Lonetree N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N Y Y Y Y N N N N 
9 Suspended N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N Y Y Y Y 
Solution 
concepts 
Nash - ✓ ✓ ✓ - ✓ ✓ ✓ - ✓ ✓ - ✓ ✓ ✓ - ✓ ✓ ✓ - ✓ ✓ ✓ 
SEQ - ✓ ✓ ✓ - ✓ ✓ ✓ - ✓ ✓ - ✓ ✓ ✓ - ✓ ✓ ✓ - ✓ ✓ ✓ 
SMR - ✓ ✓ ✓ - ✓ ✓ ✓ - ✓ ✓ - ✓ ✓ ✓ - ✓ ✓ ✓ - ✓ ✓ ✓ 
GMR - ✓ ✓ ✓ - ✓ ✓ ✓ - ✓ ✓ - ✓ ✓ ✓ - ✓ ✓ ✓ - ✓ ✓ ✓ 
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Table 6.24 Individual stability analysis of the Garrison Diversion Unit conflict with respect to Canadian Opposition 
DM # 
States 
(Ordered) 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 
US Support 
1 Full N N Y N N N Y N N N N N N Y N N N Y N N N Y N 
2 Reduced Y N N Y Y N N Y Y N Y Y N N Y Y N N Y Y N N Y 
3 Appease N Y N N N Y N N N Y N N Y N N N Y N N N Y N N 
US 
Opposition 
4 Legal N N Y Y N N Y Y N N Y N N Y Y N N Y Y N N Y Y 
Canadian 
Opposition 
5 Treaty N N N N Y Y Y Y N N N Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 
IJC 
6 Full Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N 
7 Reduced N N N N N N N N Y Y Y Y Y Y Y N N N N N N N N 
8 Lonetree N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N Y Y Y Y N N N N 
9 Suspended N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N Y Y Y Y 
Solution 
concepts 
Nash ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ - - - - ✓ ✓ ✓ - - ✓ - ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ 
SEQ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ - - - ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ - - ✓ - ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ 
SMR ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ - - - ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ 
GMR ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ - - - ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ 
 
 131 
Table 6.25 Individual stability analysis of the Garrison Diversion Unit conflict with respect to IJC 
DM # 
States 
(Ordered) 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 
US Support 
1 Full N N Y N N N Y N N N N N N Y N N N Y N N N Y N 
2 Reduced Y N N Y Y N N Y Y N Y Y N N Y Y N N Y Y N N Y 
3 Appease N Y N N N Y N N N Y N N Y N N N Y N N N Y N N 
US 
Opposition 
4 Legal N N Y Y N N Y Y N N Y N N Y Y N N Y Y N N Y Y 
Canadian 
Opposition 
5 Treaty N N N N Y Y Y Y N N N Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 
IJC 
6 Full Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N 
7 Reduced N N N N N N N N Y Y Y Y Y Y Y N N N N N N N N 
8 Lonetree N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N Y Y Y Y N N N N 
9 Suspended N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N Y Y Y Y 
Solution 
concepts 
Nash ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ 
SEQ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ 
SMR ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ 
GMR ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ 
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Table 6.26 Stability analysis of the Garrison Diversion Unit conflict showing the equilibrium states 
DM # 
States 
(Ordered) 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 
US Support 
1 Full N N Y N N N Y N N N N N N Y N N N Y N N N Y N 
2 Reduced Y N N Y Y N N Y Y N Y Y N N Y Y N N Y Y N N Y 
3 Appease N Y N N N Y N N N Y N N Y N N N Y N N N Y N N 
US 
Opposition 
4 Legal N N Y Y N N Y Y N N Y N N Y Y N N Y Y N N Y Y 
Canadian 
Opposition 
5 Treaty N N N N Y Y Y Y N N N Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 
IJC 
6 Full Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N 
7 Reduced N N N N N N N N Y Y Y Y Y Y Y N N N N N N N N 
8 Lonetree N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N Y Y Y Y N N N N 
9 Suspended N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N Y Y Y Y 
Solution 
concepts 
Nash - ✓ ✓ - - - - - - - ✓ - - - - - ✓ ✓ - - ✓ ✓ - 
SEQ - ✓ ✓ - - - - - - - ✓ - - - - - ✓ ✓ - - ✓ ✓ - 
SMR - ✓ ✓ - - - - ✓ - - ✓ - ✓ ✓ ✓ - ✓ ✓ ✓ - ✓ ✓ - 
GMR - ✓ ✓ - - - - ✓ - - ✓ - ✓ ✓ ✓ - ✓ ✓ ✓ - ✓ ✓ - 
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6.3.3 Strength of Equilibria 
The calculation of the strength of each equilibrium state was carried out using Equation 3.1. 
Since States 2, 3, 11, 17, 18, 21, and 22 have been found to equilibria under Nash, SEQ, 
SMR, and GMR solution concept, they accumulate 10 strength points each. As for the 
remaining equilibrium states, States 8, 13, 14, 15, and 19, have 3 points each due to the fact 
that they are equilibria under SMR and GMR solution concepts only.  
Table 6.27 Strength of Equilibria calculation of the Garrison Diversion Unit conflict model 
Equilibrium 
Equilibrium representation using the solution 
concepts Strength of 
Equilibrium Nash  
(4) 
SEQ  
(3) 
SMR  
(2) 
GMR  
(1) 
𝐸1 = 𝑆2 1 1 1 1 10 
𝐸2 = 𝑆3 1 1 1 1 10 
𝐸3 = 𝑆8 0 0 1 1 3 
𝐸4 = 𝑆11 1 1 1 1 10 
𝐸5 = 𝑆13 0 0 1 1 3 
𝐸6 = 𝑆14 0 0 1 1 3 
𝐸7 = 𝑆15 0 0 1 1 3 
𝐸8 = 𝑆17 1 1 1 1 10 
𝐸9 = 𝑆18 1 1 1 1 10 
𝐸10 = 𝑆19 0 0 1 1 3 
𝐸11 = 𝑆21 1 1 1 1 10 
𝐸12 = 𝑆22 1 1 1 1 10 
6.3.4 Option Effectiveness 
The Option Effectiveness computation can be carried out using Equation 3.2 for all the 
options available in the conflict model for the purpose of ranking them with respect to their 
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importance towards contributing to the resolution of the conflict.  As mentioned earlier, the 
strength of each equilibrium state serves as the basis for calculating the Option Effectiveness.  
Table 6.28 shows the option selection of each option in the columns next to each equilibrium 
state, mentioned in the left side of the table, whereas the strength of the equilibrium state is 
shown in the last column to the right.  The last row in the table computes the Option 
Effectiveness for the options available in the conflict model.  
The options can be ranked according to their importance in the conflict model.  Table 6.29 
shows the ranking of the options with respect to their importance in the conflict from “most 
important” on the left to “least important” on the right.  Options listed in the same bracket 
are tied in terms of their importance, since they have the same option effectiveness value.  
Option 5, pursuing legal action by the Canadian Opposition, is ranked as the most important 
option.  One can argue that Option 5 is the cause of the conflict, an argument that justifies 
Option 5 having the highest importance.  On the other hand, Option 4, pursuing legal action 
by US Opposition, which is ranked 2nd in Table 6.29, can be seen as a secondary cause of the 
conflict, so its 2nd rank in the importance aspect can be defended.  
Historically, the conflict ends in State 17, or 148 in decimal numbering, where the US 
Support appeases the US Opposition, and in return, the US Opposition does not pursue legal 
action.  Meanwhile, the Canadian Opposition pursues its legal action based on the Boundary 
Treaty of 1909 and IJC recommends the suspension of the whole GDU project with an 
exception for the Lonetree Reservoir. 
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Option 1, completion of the full GDU project by US Support, and Option 3, pleasing the 
US Opposition by US Support, are tied at 3rd in importance, meaning that they have a similar 
contribution towards the equilibrium states of the conflict.  Similarly, Option 6, backing the 
full completion of the GDU project by IJC, and Option 8, backing the suspension of the 
whole GDU project except the Lonetree Reservoir by the IJC, are both ranked 4th and have a 
similar contribution to the equilibria of the conflict model.  Also, Option 2, modify the GDU 
project to reduce Canadian environmental impacts by the US Support, and Option 7, backing 
the reduced scope of the GDU project by IJC to reduce Canadian environmental impacts, are 
both ranked as the options with least importance.  
For the Canadian Opposition to reach its objective of reducing the environmental dangers 
and impacts that could be caused by the GDU project, it has to make Option 2 more important 
for the US opposition. But it is currently their least important option.  The conflict ending in 
State 17 justifies the option importance ranking.  This state has Option 1 as selected, which 
is the most important option in the whole dispute; Option 3 is chosen, which is the most 
important option for US Support; and Option 8 as exercised by IJC, which is their most 
important option.  Option 4, which is ranked 2nd in option importance, is not selected because 
US Support has decided to appease US Opposition, and in return, US Opposition would not 
pursue any legal action. 
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Table 6.28 Option Effectiveness calculation of the Garrison Diversion Unit conflict model 
 𝑶𝟏 𝑶𝟐 𝑶𝟑 𝑶𝟒 𝑶𝟓 𝑶𝟔 𝑶𝟕 𝑶𝟖 𝑶𝟗 
Strength of 
Equilibrium 
𝑬𝟏 = 𝑺𝟐 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 10 
𝑬𝟐 = 𝑺𝟑 1 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 10 
𝑬𝟑 = 𝑺𝟖 0 1 0 1 1 1 0 0 0 3 
𝑬𝟒 = 𝑺𝟏𝟏 0 1 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 10 
𝑬𝟓 = 𝑺𝟏𝟑 0 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 0 3 
𝑬𝟔 = 𝑺𝟏𝟒 1 0 0 1 1 0 1 0 0 3 
𝑬𝟕 = 𝑺𝟏𝟓 0 1 0 1 1 0 1 0 0 3 
𝑬𝟖 = 𝑺𝟏𝟕 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 1 0 10 
𝑬𝟗 = 𝑺𝟏𝟖 1 0 0 1 1 0 0 1 0 10 
𝑬𝟏𝟎 = 𝑺𝟏𝟗 0 1 0 1 1 0 0 1 0 3 
𝑬𝟏𝟏 = 𝑺𝟐𝟏 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 1 10 
𝑬𝟏𝟐 = 𝑺𝟐𝟐 1 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 1 10 
Option 
Effectiveness 
33 19 33 52 55 23 19 23 20  
 
Table 6.29 Option importance ranking in the Garrison Diversion Unit conflict model 
 𝑶𝟓 𝑶𝟒 [𝑶𝟏 𝑶𝟑] [𝑶𝟔 𝑶𝟖] 𝑶𝟗 [𝑶𝟐 𝑶𝟕] 
Action 
Description 
Treaty Legal Full Appease Full Lonetree Suspended Reduced Reduced 
Option 
Effectiveness 
55 52 33 33 23 23 20 19 19 
DM 
Canadian 
Opposition 
US 
Opposition 
US 
Support 
US 
Support 
IJC IJC IJC 
US 
Support 
IJC 
 
6.4  Summary 
The Option Effectiveness approach has been applied to three real-world conflict models and 
has demonstrated its capacity to illuminate conflicts at the option level.  The approach has 
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shown promising conclusions, and seems to allow a better understanding for analysts about 
options and their importance in a conflict.  
The approach has shown that it can identify options that are the root cause of conflicts and 
usually have the highest option effectiveness values.  Meanwhile, options that are less likely 
to be part of any resolution tend to have very low option effectiveness values, indicating their 
insignificance in the conflict model.  The Option Effectiveness has been able to predict which 
option would be a better counter-move among a set of options. In many cases, an option that 
can be used as an effective counter-move for the opposing DM is ranked 2nd among all the 
options.  Furthermore, options selected in the real-world resolution of a dispute tend to be 
ranked higher than other options in the Option Effectiveness ranking order.  The information 
revealed by this approach allows DMs clarity about the options in-hand and may focus their 
efforts to resolve conflicts in their favor. 
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Chapter 7 
Conclusions and Future Work 
The investigation of the economic conflict between China and the US was carried out by 
using the GMCR methodology.  The results indicate that China is well on its way to overcome 
the US as the world’s largest economic superpower. In fact, the study revealed that 
establishing the AIIB by China was the root cause of the conflict, while forcing China to 
accept US terms was the best counter-move in the second phase of the dispute.  The analysis 
of the third phase of the conflict has shown that China is strengthening its economic position 
by implementing the RCEP agreement. 
The newly introduced method, Option Effectiveness, has shown satisfactory results and 
allowed further understanding when applied to the real-world conflict models of the Elmira 
Groundwater Contamination conflict, the Cuban Missile Crisis conflict, and the Garrison 
Diversion Unit conflict.  In fact, the approach has helped in achieving a strategic 
understanding at the option level of the conflicts.  The approach has illustrated its capability 
of ranking the options with respect to their importance. Option Effectiveness can help DMs 
in a dispute in turning the tides of the conflict in their favor.   
The classification of states by a pattern which can be used in categorizing states into groups 
was proposed by Fang et al. (2003a, 2003b).  Automation of the proposed classification can 
be handled by the Option Effectiveness approach, and the novel approach can classify the 
equilibrium states through the importance of the options.  For instance, a category can consist 
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of the states in which the most effective option is chosen, whereas the states where the least 
effective option is selected can form another category.  To sum up, the Option Effectiveness 
procedure is able to automate the initial categorization process for the equilibrium states.  
7.1 Future Work 
The preferences of the DMs involved in a conflict play an essential role in constructing a 
conflict model using the GMCR methodology constructs.  The stability analysis of the 
conflict model is entirely dependent on these preferences, as it is the only way to determine 
the UIs for a DM in a conflict model.  Therefore, an extension of the Option Effectiveness 
approach can be modeled which considers the preferences of the DMs in the computation of 
option effectiveness.  A preliminary approach is mentioned in Appendix A which considers 
the preferences of DMs for the equilibrium states of the conflict model and includes it in the 
option effectiveness computations.  Further research can be directed in this area to optimize 
the approach and apply it to real-world conflict models for evaluation. 
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Appendix A 
Preferential Option Effectiveness 
The preference ranking of states is an integral aspect of the GMCR methodology, especially 
for stability analysis.  An extension of the Option Effectiveness approach mentioned in 
Section 3.2 can be considered in terms of its importance to conclude the conflict into the 
preferred states by the DMs.  Considering the preference ranking of the states that should 
have been established during GMCR modeling stage, one can rank the equilibria in 
accordance to the state-preference rankings that they represent.  The equilibria preference 
ranking can then be used to further strengthen an equilibrium state, meaning that not only is 
the stability analysis considered in the proposed approach, but also that the DM's preferences 
play an important role in measuring option effectiveness.  Assuming that DM 𝑖’s preferences 
are 𝑆𝐷𝑀𝑖
𝑃𝑟𝑒𝑓 =  𝑆1 ⪰𝒊 𝑆2 ⪰𝒊 … ⪰𝒊 𝑆𝑛,  where 𝑛 is the total number of states and the states are 
ranked from most important to least important, one can map the equilibria states in the same 
manner such that they are ranked from most important to least important, where each 𝐸𝑖 is 
mapped to its corresponding 𝑆𝑛 in the model.  For example, a GMCR model of four feasible 
states has the preference ranking for a DM 𝑖 as 𝑆𝐷𝑀𝑖
𝑃𝑟𝑒𝑓 =  𝑆3 ≻𝑖 𝑆2 ≻𝑖 𝑆4 ≻𝑖 𝑆1 and has two 
equilibria states such that 𝐸1 =  𝑆2 and 𝐸2 =  𝑆3 then 𝐸𝐷𝑀𝑖
𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑓 = 𝐸2 ≻𝑖 𝐸1 , since for DM 𝑖,  𝑆3 
≻𝑖 𝑆2.  Moreover, the equilibria states are allowed to have equal preference rankings such 
that the DM is impartial about them.  In the previous example, if 𝑆𝐷𝑀𝑖
𝑃𝑟𝑒𝑓 =
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 𝑆3 ∼𝑖 𝑆2 ≻𝑖 𝑆4 ≻𝑖 𝑆1DM 𝑖, then accordingly 𝐸2 ∼𝑖 𝐸1, meaning that DM 𝑖 equally prefers 
𝐸1 and 𝐸2. 
Now that the process of ranking the equilibria in terms of DMs’ preferences is clear, a 
weight can be assigned for each equilibrium state in terms of its preference for the DM such 
that the most preferred equilibria is assigned a weight 𝑤𝐷𝑀𝑖= 𝑌 where 𝑌 is the total number 
equilibria states in the model.  Subsequently, the next preferred equilibrium state is assigned 
a weight of 𝑤𝐷𝑀𝑖 = (𝑌 − 1) and so on for all the remaining equilibria.  Equilibria states with 
mutual preference rankings are assigned the same weight.  Hence, the preferential strength 
of an equilibrium state with respect to DM 𝑖 is denoted by:  
 𝑆𝑇𝑅𝑃𝑅𝐸𝐹𝐷𝑀𝑖(𝐸𝑦) = 𝑆𝑇𝑅(𝐸𝑦) × 𝑤𝐷𝑀𝑖(𝐸𝑦) (A.1) 
Accordingly, the Preferential Option Effectiveness is computed by substituting 𝑆𝑇𝑅(𝐸𝑦) in 
Equation 3.2 with 𝑆𝑇𝑅𝑃𝑅𝐸𝐹𝐷𝑀𝑖(𝐸𝑦): 
 𝐸𝐹𝐹𝑃𝑅𝐸𝐹𝐷𝑀𝑖
 (𝑂𝑚) = ∑ 𝑎𝑦𝑚
𝑌
y=1
 𝑆𝑇𝑅𝑃𝑅𝐸𝐹𝐷𝑀𝑖(𝐸𝑦) (A.2) 
where 
𝑎𝑦𝑚 = {
1, 𝑖𝑓 𝑂𝑝𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝑚 𝑖𝑠 𝑠𝑒𝑙𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑒𝑑
0, 𝑜𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑤𝑖𝑠𝑒
, 
𝐸𝑦 is the equilibrium state,  𝑂𝑚  is the 𝑚
𝑡ℎ option, which may be selected or not under 
𝐸𝑦, 𝑌 is the total number of equilibrium states, and 𝑀 is the total number of options 
available. 
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Similar to the tabular approach for calculating the standard Option Effectiveness, one can 
use a tabular approach shown in Table A.1 to calculate the Preferential Option Effectiveness.  
Table A.1 is essentially the same as Table 3.3 with the addition of a new column at the end 
to represent the preferential strength of each equilibria and a new row below the option 
effectiveness to represent the Preferential Option Effectiveness.  
Table A.1 Tabular form of Preferential Option Effectiveness approach for DM 𝑖 
 𝑂1 𝑂2 … 𝑂𝑀 
Strength of 
Equilibrium 
Preference 
Weight 
Preferential 
Strength of 
Equilibrium 
𝐸1 𝑎11 𝑎12 … 𝑎1𝑚 𝑆𝑇𝑅 (𝐸1) 𝑤(𝐸1) 𝑆𝑇𝑅𝑃𝑅𝐸𝐹𝐷𝑀𝑖(𝐸1) 
𝐸2 𝑎21 𝑎22 … 𝑎2𝑚 𝑆𝑇𝑅 (𝐸2) 𝑤(𝐸2) 𝑆𝑇𝑅𝑃𝑅𝐸𝐹𝐷𝑀𝑖(𝐸2) 
⋮ ⋮ ⋮  ⋮ ⋮ ⋮  
𝐸𝑌 𝑎𝑌,1 𝑎𝑌,2 … 𝑎𝑌𝑀 𝑆𝑇𝑅 (𝐸𝑌) 𝑤(𝐸𝑌) 𝑆𝑇𝑅𝑃𝑅𝐸𝐹𝐷𝑀𝑖(𝐸𝑌) 
Option 
Effectiveness 
𝐸𝐹𝐹 (𝑂1) 𝐸𝐹𝐹 (𝑂2) … 𝐸𝐹𝐹(𝑂𝑀)    
Preferential 
Option 
Effectiveness 
𝐸𝐹𝐹𝑃𝑅𝐸𝐹𝐷𝑀𝑖  (𝑂1) 𝐸𝐹𝐹𝑃𝑅𝐸𝐹𝐷𝑀𝑖  (𝑂2) … 𝐸𝐹𝐹𝑃𝑅𝐸𝐹𝐷𝑀𝑖(𝑂𝑀)  
 
 
 
 
